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Between	Choice	and	Tradition:	Rethinking	Remedial	Grace	Periods	and	
Unconstitutionality	Management	in	a	Comparative	Light	
Ming-Sung Kuo∗ 
 
<Abstract> 
Recent experiences of constitutional review in the Common Law world have received 
increasing attention in comparative constitutional law scholarship.  Looking beyond 
the Common Law jurisdictions, this Article investigates into the influence of variations 
on unconstitutionality management and changing constitutional politics on the 
functional mutation of remedial grace periods.  Through a case study of Taiwan in a 
comparative light, it argues that legal tradition and the court’s role vis-à-vis the 
political branch in the dynamics of constitutional politics jointly contribute to the 
multifunctional role of remedial grace periods in unconstitutionality management.  As 
part of unconstitutionality management across constitutional jurisdictions, the granting 
of remedial grace periods is not simply the manifestation of judicial strategy.  The 
argument unfolds in three main Parts.  Part II first compares the use of remedial grace 
periods in constitutional review under the Civilian-Continental and the Common Law 
models.  After drawing out the different paths toward unconstitutionality management 
in comparative constitutional review, Part III conducts a functional analysis of 
remedial grace periods in the case law of the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC).  It 
is observed that the three forms of remedial grace periods—bridging, nudging, and 
hedging—as indicated in the TCC case law are informed by the conceptual framework 
of graduated unconstitutionality borrowed from the Civilian-Continental model.  Part 
IV further analyzes how remedial grace periods have been instrumental to the TCC’s 
realization of its institutional potential.  In conclusion, the TCC’s continuing and 
frequent prescription for remedial grace periods indicates its default position in 
constitutional remedies, which is both informed by the Civilian-Continental model and 
shaped by its formative experience at the dawn of democratization.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Stories about Marbury v. Madison1 have been told time and again in constitutional 
scholarship.2   Obscured in its political twists and turns and the all too familiar end 
result—the accidental impregnation of modern constitutional review3—is an arcane legal 
                                                
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2 See, e.g., ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF 
THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 163-98 (2005); 
PAUL W KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997). 
3 See MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 94 (2014).  
For a critical discussion of such characterization of Marbury v. Madison, see Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. 
Madison around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251 (2004).  In this Article, constitutional review refers to the 
review of the conformity of statutes (as well as other state acts) to the constitution by courts or other 
quasi-judicial but independent institutions such as the French Constitutional Council.  In this sense, 
constitutional review is a special type of judicial review.  For discussion of the pre-Marbury v. Madison traces 
of constitutional review in Europe, see DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
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question: Did the Supreme Court have the power to issue a writ of mandamus?4  Though the 
Supreme Court acknowledged William Marbury’s and his co-petitioners’ legal right being 
infringed, it eventually denied them the remedy that would bring them the withheld 
commissions for their appointment as the justices of the peace on constitutional grounds.5  
As the way Chief Justice Marshall framed the legal issues concerned suggested, Marbury v. 
Madison not only fathered modern constitutional review but also indicated the distinctiveness 
and significance of the question of remedy by linking constitutional review to the vindication 
of individual rights.6  Viewed thus, remedy stands as a distinct issue apart from the 
judgment as to the constitutional compatibility of the impugned state act7 in constitutional 
review. 
In the long shadow of Marbury v. Madison, the granting of a grace period for a state act 
found constitutionally invalid is considered a choice as to remedies in constitutional review.8  
Seen in this light, granting a “remedial grace period”9 amounts to a legal technique to 
suspend or delay the declaration of (constitutional) invalidity of an impugned state act while 
a “suspension order” or a “suspended declaration of invalidity” becomes a new addition to 
                                                                                                                                                  
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 4 (3rd ed. 2012).  Judicial review of statutes 
according to a statutory bill of rights in Britain, New Zealand as well as part of Australia is not within the scope 
of the present Article.  For judicial review under a statutory bill of rights, see STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW 
COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013); cf. ROBERT LECKEY, BILLS 
OF RIGHTS IN THE COMMON LAW (2015) (observing continuities and changes between the earlier review of 
provincial and colonial legislation and judicial review under the bill of rights in Canada, South Africa as well as 
Britain).         
4 See Susan Low Bloch, Marbury Redux: A Comment on Suzanna Sherry, in ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON, 
supra note 2, at 60.  
5 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80. 
6 Id. at 154.  See also Bruce K. Miller & Neal E. Devins, Constitutional Rights without Remedies: Judicial 
Review of Underinclusive Legislation, 70 (3) JUDICATURE 151, 153-54 (1986). 
7 For present purposes, a state act under constitutional review is that which is subject to judicial review for 
its constitutional conformity, or rather, constitutionality.  It can result from the political branch, such as 
statutes, executive decisions, and administrative rules.  In this sense, a judicial ruling is a state act by the court.   
8 E.g., LECKEY, supra note 3, at 102-06, 137-44; Po Jen Yap, New Democracies and Novel Remedies, [2017] 
PUB. L. 30; Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delays, 91 TUL. L. REV. 259 (2016); 
Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA. L. REV. 322, 339-40, 360-62 (2016); Kent Roach, 
Constitutional, Remedial and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. J. 
INT’L L. 537, 546-53 (2005); Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: 
When Is It Appropriate, Just and Equitable?, 122 S. AFR. L.J. 325, 334-35, 338-41 (2005). 
9 Lau, supra note 8. 
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the toolkit of constitutional remedies.10  Along these lines, decisions such as Minister of 
Home Affairs v. Fourie of the South African Constitutional Court11 and W v. Registrar of 
Marriages of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal12 have been labeled as “suspension 
orders with bite” in comparative studies of constitutional remedies.13  Besides prescribing a 
grace period, those decisions further provide for the legal framework needed to redress 
constitutional injustice caused by the impugned legislation should the legislature fail to act at 
the grace period’s end.14  Taken as a whole, the granting of grace periods and suspension 
orders (with or without bite) are remedy choices aimed at delaying the invalidity (or 
invalidating/ voiding effect) of the impugned state act resulting from its being found 
constitutionally incompatible.   
Paralleling the foregoing account mainly based on the Common Law jurisdictions, this 
Article aims to shed light on how variations on the management of unconstitutionality and 
changing constitutional politics bear on remedial grace periods becoming a permissible 
choice in constitutional review through a comparative study of the Taiwan Constitutional 
Court (TCC) (1949-2018).15  As will become clear, in contrast to judicial practices in other 
constitutional jurisdictions, remedial grace periods are more of rule than of exception in 
Taiwan,16 evolving into the defining feature of the TCC’s case law.  Mindful of the TCC’s 
unique case law in comparative jurisprudence of remedial grace periods, I shall argue that it 
is a function of both Taiwan’s received continental model of constitutional review, under 
which invalidity is distinguished from incompatibility to manage the implications of 
unconstitutionality, and the role of the TCC vis-à-vis the political regime in Taiwan’s 
                                                
10 Yap, supra note 8.  
11 [2005] ZACC 19. 
12 [2013] 2 HKLRD 90. 
13 Yap, supra note 8, at 37-39. 
14 Id. 
15 The argument submitted in this Article is based on the TCC case law in the period between 1949 and 
December 31, 2018 during which the TCC promulgated 773 decisions (officially designated as Interpretations).  
The TCC’s latest decision is Interpretation No. 774, which was issued on January 11, 2019.  The full-text 
Chinese version of all the TCC interpretations discussed in this paper is available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03.asp.  Full-text English translation (holding and reasoning 
only) of all the TCC interpretations except Interpretation No. 744, 747, 749-51, 753, 756, 758-74 is available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp. 
16 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 
143 (2003). 
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changing constitutional landscape.  Seen in this light, the continuing and frequent granting 
of remedial grace periods in Taiwan is more reflective of the TCC’s default option in 
deciding on the constitutionality of the impugned state act than of its strategic choice of 
remedy in individual cases.  With the distinction between incompatibility and invalidity 
brought to the fore in comparative constitutional law, the subtle difference between the 
practice of judicial admonitions of incompatibility in the continental model of constitutional 
review17 and the remedial suspension orders as employed in the Common Law jurisdictions 
can be thrown into sharp relief.  As part of unconstitutionality management across 
constitutional jurisdictions, the granting of remedial grace periods is not simply the 
manifestation of judicial strategy but rather a function of legal tradition and the calculated 
judicial choice in light of changing constitutional politics.   
Apart from Introduction and Conclusion, the argument unfolds in three Parts.  Part II 
compares the use of remedial grace periods in constitutional review under what I call the 
Civilian-Continental and the Common Law model.  Notably, constitutional review is 
traditionally classified into two types—centralized and decentralize—in scholarship with the 
former being conventionally associated with continental European countries, which share the 
Civil Law tradition, and the latter prevailing in the Common Law countries.18  To indicate 
the role legal tradition plays in the management of unconstitutionality,19 I instead adopt the 
terms the “Civilian-Continental model” and the “Common Law model” to denote the two 
conventional types of constitutional review respectively in my ideal-type approach to 
comparative studies of remedial grace periods.20  As will become clear, the granting of 
                                                
17 Judicial admonitions refers to “admonitory decisions” (Appellentscheidungen) in German constitutional 
jurisprudence.  See Wiltraut Rupp-v. Brünneck, Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court, 20 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 387 (1972).  I shall further address the substance of judicial admonitions when I discuss the TCC case law 
in Part III, infra.  
18 For a classical discussion, see Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1017 (1970).   
19 Víctor Ferreres Comella notes the influence of the Civil Law tradition on the countries that adopt a 
centralized system of constitutional review.  VÍCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND 
DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 20-24 (2009). 
20 For the ideal-type approach to comparative law, see generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF 
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1991).  Needless to say, 
not all the Civil Law countries adopt centralized constitutional review as exemplified by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (GFCC).  For example, Japan, some Latin American countries, and Nordic countries have 
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remedial grace periods in constitutional review in the Common Law jurisdictions is 
considered a judicial choice in remedy in response to the impugned state act’s invalidation.  
In contrast, under the Civilian-Continental model, constitutional courts have granted grace 
periods to allow themselves to steer a middle course between the lameness of declarations of 
incompatibility (vis-à-vis invalidity) and the sweeping voiding/ invalidating effect of striking 
down unconstitutional state acts.   
After drawing out the different paths in the Civilian-Continental and the Common Law 
jurisdictions, I continue with a case study based on the TCC case law in light of the foregoing 
comparative analysis.  Part III provides a tripartite typology following an overview of the 
use of remedial grace periods in Taiwan.  Remedial grace periods have been prescribed for 
three distinct functions—bridging, nudging, and hedging—each of which is centered on the 
distinction between incompatibility and invalidity in the Civilian-Continental model of 
constitutional review.  Part IV explains why the TCC’s granting of remedial grace periods 
falls short of its deliberate strategic choice of constitutional remedies by tracking the 
development of remedial grace periods along the TCC’s evolving role in Taiwan’s changing 
political landscape.     
A terminological clarification is due before proceeding.  A declaration of invalidity 
refers to a judgement of an unconstitutional state act (especially in the case of statutes) that 
results in the immediate invalidation of the impugned state act.  In this sense, a declaration 
of invalidity corresponds to the practical effects (vis-à-vis the logical conclusion) of a 
“declaration of nullity” (Nichtigkeitserklärung) in German constitutional jurisprudence.21  
In this Article, I adopt the more popular Common Law term, the declaration of invalidity, to 
                                                                                                                                                  
modelled constitutional review after the US-style decentralized judicial review.  See FERRERES COMELLA, 
supra note 19, at 4-5.  Notably, South Africa is a hybrid case.  On the one hand, as a legacy of its colonial 
past, South African legal system contains elements of the Roman-Dutch law and the English common law 
alongside its local customary law.  See JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN 
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652-2000, at 92-95 (2008).  On the other hand, 
it has installed a powerful constitutional court at the end of the Apartheid while other high courts are allowed to 
exercise constitutional review on some issues.  South African Constitution s. 172 (2).  When it comes to the 
compatibility of state acts with the constitutional bill of rights, South Africa has been studied along with other 
Common Law countries.  See, e.g., LECKEY, supra note 3, at 48-51; Yap, supra note 8. 
21 GFCC, Constitutional Justice: Functions and Relationship with the Other Public Authorities, NATIONAL 
REPORT FOR THE XVTH CONGRESS OF THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 12, 39 (2011).  
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include the declaration of nullity under the German and other Civilian-Continental model of 
constitutional review.  As regards the declaration of incompatibility, it refers to a simple 
declaratory judgment of an unconstitutional state act to the effect that the impugned act is 
found incompatible or inconsistent with the constitution but is left unaltered in terms of 
enforceability.22    
II. REMEDIAL GRACE PERIODS IN COMPARISON: TWO 
APPROACHES TO MANAGING UNCONSTITUTIONALITY  
In this Part, I first discuss the granting of remedial grace periods in the 
Civilian-Continental model of constitutional review, tracing its origin to the distinction 
between invalidity/ nullity and incompatibility in constitutional doctrine.  I suggest that 
instead of an innovation in judicial remedy, the granting of remedial grace periods, together 
with the doctrinal invalidity-incompatibility distinction, is part of the constitutional court’s 
endeavors to reconceive of the concept of unconstitutionality and thus manage its 
consequences.  Next I discuss whether and, if so, to what extent the granting of grace 
periods in constitutional review in the Common Law jurisdictions is new in terms of their 
traditional equitable approach to judicial remedy.     
A. Toward Graduated Unconstitutionality: The Civilian-Continental 
Model 
The German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) has established itself as the exemplar 
of the Civilian-Continental model of constitutional review since its inauguration in 1951 
when the nascent Federal Republic was only beginning to take shape as a constitutional 
democracy.23  It takes pride in its role as the guardian of the constitution and the protector of 
                                                
22 Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) may be the most noted example of the declaration of 
incompatibility (vis-à-vis invalidity) in judicial review, although it is not in the constitutional context as defined 
in this paper.  See GARDBAUM, supra note 3, at 29-30.  In Germany, the functional equivalent is the 
declaration of the condemned state act as “simply incompatible (unvereinbar)” instead of “null and void 
(nichtig).”  See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
23 JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
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fundamental rights for which the GFCC is regarded as “the model to emulate.”24  Although 
the procedure for constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) has been installed since 
its early days, the framers of the Basic Law, inspired by the experience of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court of the 1920s (ACC),25 were mainly concerned with guarding the 
abstract constitutionality of state acts (especially statutes) when they conceived of the 
institution of constitutional review.26  The early focus on the compatibility (or consistency) 
of state acts with the constitution in the institutional design of the GFCC sheds illuminating 
light on the granting of grace periods under the Civilian-Continental model of constitutional 
review. 
Conceived in Hans Kelsen’s image of the Stufenbau of the legal system, the ACC, the 
prototype of the Civilian-Continental model of constitutional review, was created to 
guarantee the integrity of the hierarchical legal system with the constitution sitting atop it.27  
According to Kelsen’s pure theory of law, as the legal authority of a regulation under that 
hierarchical system derives from the law at higher level, a statute that deviates from the 
authorization of the legal rule above it, i.e., the constitution, should be devoid of legality.  
Allowing an unconstitutional statute, which has no legal authority, to remain in force would 
be contradictory to the very idea of the legal system as a hierarchical structure (Stufenbau).  
Thus, to Kelsen, constitutional review is more than an institutional choice.  Instead, it is a 
conclusion necessitated by the hierarchical order of the legal system.  As Kelsen’s 
brainchild, the ACC functioned as a “negative legislator” tasked to guard the integrity of the 
Austrian constitutional system against internal contradiction resulting from unauthorized 
legal rules, especially unconstitutional statutes, even though no personal interest or individual 
right would be actually affected because of an unconstitutional statute.28 
                                                                                                                                                  
COURT, 1951-2001, at xxviii-xlii. 
24 DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 62.      
25 See KLAUS VON BEYME, AMERICA AS A MODEL: THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD 
94-95 (1987). 
26 KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 3, at 8-9, 12. 
27 F. Rubio Llorente, Constitutional Jurisdiction as Law-Making, in LAW IN THE MAKING: A COMPARATIVE 
SURVEY 156, 165-66 (Alessandro Pizzorusso ed., 1988). 
28 Id. at 166. 
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Through this lens, as a rule, an unconstitutional statute is naturally null and void at its 
enactment as it never acquires legality because of its unconstitutionality. 29  
Correspondingly, the finding of unconstitutionality of the impugned statute by constitutional 
review must be declaratory in nature as it is essentially an authoritative restatement of what 
has already taken place and has continued to exist, the state of unconstitutionality.30  Once 
such an authoritative judgment is promulgated, the impugned statute is considered invalid 
since its enactment.  Viewed thus, a declaration of unconstitutionality would result in the ex 
tunc invalidation of the impugned state act.31  Nullity is not so much a chosen remedy in 
response to an unconstitutional state act as the only logical conclusion dictated by the finding 
of its unconstitutionality. 32  Unconstitutionality (Verfassungswidrigkeit) is synonymous 
with nullity (Nichtigkeit) or invalidity. 
Problems with such a conceptual approach to the constitutional control of state acts 
arose quickly when the GFCC was still in incubation.  One of the most pressing issues 
concerned the impact of a declaration of nullity/ invalidity on the stability and certainty of 
the legal order.33  For example, a judicial decision based on a statute that was later declared 
unconstitutional and thus invalid would be annulled because conceptually it was regarded as 
legally groundless despite res judicata.34  Moreover, with constitutional review extending to 
the protection of fundamental rights, a declaration of unconstitutionality could do more harm 
than good to the claimant, especially when the impugned statute concerned beneficial 
entitlements or equal treatment.  Notably, such drastic effects were not the result of unwise 
choices in judicial remedy but the logical conclusion drawn from the conceptual framework 
                                                
29 DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 317.  It is noteworthy that Kelsen himself softened the link between 
unconstitutionality and voidness for reasons of legal certainty by replacing the latter with the concept of 
“voidability.”  Llorente, supra note 27, at 167.  In this way, the effects of the ACC’s judgements of 
unconstitutionality have been prospective in principle since its inception.  Id.; FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 
189 at 25, 176 n. 25.  
30 Llorente, supra note 27, at 167.  
31 DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 317. 
32 Id. at 312, 320. 
33 Rupp-v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 390-91. 
34 DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 317. 
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informing the GFCC and other Civil Law jurisdictions of constitutional review.35 
To mitigate the severe effects of declarations of unconstitutionality, the GFCC and its 
designers have taken pains to reshape the foregoing conceptual framework through 
constitutional jurisprudence as well as legislation, pointing in the direction of graduated 
unconstitutionality.  On the one hand, the GFCC designers managed to restrict the 
retroactive effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality while continuing to maintain the 
rule that a declaration of unconstitutionality would lead to the ex tunc invalidation of the 
impugned state act.36  Interestingly, though the effects of invalidating unconstitutional state 
acts have been mostly ex nunc in practice, such practices are still considered to be ad hoc 
instances of pragmatic measures that do not displace the rule of ex tunc invalidation.37  On 
the other hand, the GFCC gradually separated the decision on legal effects from the judgment 
of unconstitutionality by declaring the impugned state act “incompatible” (unvereinbar) with 
the constitution or simply unconstitutional without ordering it to be invalid/ void (nichtig).38  
As a result, unconstitutionality, incompatibility, and invalidity were no longer synonyms.  
Only a declaration of unconstitutionality buttressed with an order of invalidity would lead to 
the annulment of the impugned state act.  In contrast, a state act found incompatible with the 
constitution only would remain in force since it was not legally invalidated.39  With 
unconstitutionality understood as a graduated state rather than a unitary concept, the doctrinal 
distinction between invalidity and incompatibility emerged, providing the GFCC with the 
conceptual tool needed to mitigate the legal effects of finding a state act unconstitutional. 
Yet, that new conceptual framework soon raised further issues about the legal effects of 
                                                
35 Id. at 320. 
36 Rupp-v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 391; Wolfgang Zeidler, Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany: Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 504, 518 
(1987). 
37 Compare DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 317, with Llorente, supra note 27, at 167. 
38 KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 3, at 35-36; DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 320-24; Rupp-v. Brünneck, 
supra note 17, at 398; Llorente, supra note 27, at 173-74, 178; Zeidler, supra note 36, at 516-18. 
39 The conventional wisdom holds that German state authorities should and actually have exercised prudence 
in the continuing enforcement of the state act found incompatible with the constitution, regardless of whether 
the GFCC prescribed a grace period at all.  Zeidler, supra note 36, at 519.  Yet, the German experience 
should not be taken for granted in light of the mixed record of other jurisdictions that subscribe to the 
distinction between declarations of invalidity and incompatibility.  See DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 320-24. 
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the GFCC’s negative decisions on the constitutionality of the impugned state act.  What 
would happen to such an unconstitutional but not invalid act?  Could the administration 
continue to enforce a statute having been declared incompatible with the constitution?  
Would such a declaration of incompatibility implicate any legal obligation to rectify to the 
administration or the parliament?  What if the administration and the parliament failed to 
act?  In response to these questions resulting from the distinction between invalidity and 
incompatibility, the GFCC jurisprudence drew inspiration from the Austrian experience and 
embraced the legal technique of granting grace periods for state acts found incompatible with 
the constitution.40 
Granted, the granting of grace periods has been just part of the GFCC’s robust strategy 
of self-enforcement in response to state acts found incompatible with the constitution without 
being invalidated. 41   Nevertheless, the variations on the granting of grace periods 
themselves, which are of particular pertinence to my present purposes, merit close 
examination.  In some cases, the GFCC has prescribed that the impugned state act be 
amended within a fixed period of time or by a definite deadline apart from declaring it 
incompatible with the constitution.  For example, in a case concerning the inheritance tax, 
the GFCC stipulated that the impugned statutory provision be further applied “‘until a new 
provision’ and set a deadline for this new provision of 31 December 2008 at the latest.”42  In 
other cases, the GFCC has instead ordered that the impugned state act continue to be valid 
until a set date along with a declaration of incompatibility.  For example, in a case regarding 
the constitutionality of the property tax statute, the GFCC ordered that the impugned statute 
“continue to apply until 31 December 1996 ‘at most.’”43   
                                                
40 Rupp-v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 395. 
41 The GFCC Act s. 35 reads, “The Federal Constitutional Court may specify in its decision who is to 
execute it; in individual cases it may also specify the method of execution.”  The official English translation of 
the GFCC Act is available at 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=publicatio
nFile&v=5.   See GFCC, supra note 21, at 12-15, 38-43; see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 3, at 36; 
Rupp-v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 391-95; Llorente, supra note 27, at 173-74; Zeidler, supra note 36, at 
516-18.   
42 GFCC, supra note 21, at 43 (discussing BVerfGE 117, 1). 
43 Id. (discussing BVerfGE 93, 121). 
 12 
It is noteworthy that the above two types of grace periods make no practical difference 
in Germany as the parliament and the administration as well as other public authorities have 
been faithfully responsive to the GFCC’s calls for rectification virtually without exception.44  
Yet, they are distinct in legal terms.  In the first type as the inheritance tax case illustrated, 
grace periods were mainly aimed to urge the parliament or the administration to take 
rectificatory actions; in the second, grace periods were granted to avoid immediate 
invalidation in situations like the property tax case.  Thus, in terms of legal effects, a 
fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between the orders of granting grace periods as 
discussed above.  In the first case, had the parliament failed to amend the impugned 
inheritance tax statutory provision by the deadline of December 31, 2008, that provision 
would have continued to apply as it was only declared incompatible rather than invalid and 
remained in force.45  In contrast, in the second case, had the impugned property tax statute 
not been rectified by December 31, 1996, the impugned statute would have lapsed after the 
expiry of the deadline as the GFCC had sunset its validity besides the declaration of 
incompatibility.46  Although both cases are examples of declarations of incompatibility 
accompanied by grace periods, their legal effects are different.  While the judgment in the 
second case amounted to a suspended declaration of invalidity as it actually rendered the 
validity of the impugned statute time-bound, the first judgment was merely a declaration of 
incompatibility since the elapse of the court-prescribed grace period would have no direct 
legal effects on the impugned statutory provision.47  The doctrinal distinction between 
incompatibility and invalidity informs the differentiated legal effects of the GFCC’s granting 
of grace periods.  
In sum, how to mitigate the drastic legal effects of a state act being declared 
unconstitutional, i.e., the ex tunc invalidation, is a central concern to German constitutional 
                                                
44 Compare id. at 42-43, with Zeidler, supra note 36, at 519.  For rare instances of public defiance on the 
GFCC, see COLLINGS, supra note 23, at 260-74.  
45 GFCC, supra note 21, at 43. 
46 Id. 
47 The GFCC has been increasingly assertive when making a declaration of incompatibility.  Apart from 
turning it into a suspended declaration of invalidity by setting a deadline for the validity of the impugned state 
act, it has added more and more specific instructions as to the anticipated statutory reform or imposed interim 
measures on its own.  For further discussion, see id. at 38-43.  
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framers.  Since such effects are considered the logical conclusion drawn from the traditional 
conceptual approach to constitutional interpretation, the solution begins with the conceptual 
distinction between invalidity and incompatibility in doctrine.  Once that distinction is 
recognized, a concept of graduated unconstitutionality develops, enabling the GFCC to work 
adroitly around the issues surrounding the unconstitutionality of a state act.  With grace 
periods, the GFCC has further saved itself from the hard choice between the lameness of 
declarations of incompatibility and the drastic effect of declarations of invalidity.  Seen in 
this light, granting grace periods is more part of the efforts to address the practical issues 
resulting from the doctrinal distinction between incompatibility and invalidity than a legal 
technique in judicial remedy.  The incompatibility/ invalidity distinction holds the key to 
understanding the granting of grace periods under the Civilian-Continental model of 
constitutional review,48 including Taiwan.    
B. “New” Choices in Judicial Remedy? The Common Law Model 
Although Marbury v. Madison of the United States has long been considered the origin 
of modern judicial review, there is no consensus as to whether the introduction of 
constitutional review in other Common Law jurisdictions is a continuity or a break with their 
shared legal tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.49  Yet, despite the debate over the 
newness of the recent adoption of (quasi-)constitutional review in Canada and South Africa 
and other Common Law jurisdictions, scholars agree on the novelty of granting grace periods 
in judicial declarations of (constitutional) invalidity as to state acts.50  But how novel is it?  
Is it novel only in the Common Law world?  Is it distinctive in the broader landscape of 
comparative constitutional law? 
In contrast to the Civilian-Continental model of constitutional review aimed at the 
abstract constitutional control of state acts as discussed above, constitutional review 
                                                
48 See DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 317-24. 
49 Compare GARDBAUM, supra note 3, with LECKEY, supra note 3.  See also MARK TUSHNET, WEAK 
COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (2008). 
50 See LECKEY, supra note 3, at 102-03; Yap, supra note 8; Roach, supra note 8, at 546.  
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developed out of the traditional judicial function in the Common Law world. 51  
Corresponding to its traditional common law review, remedy choice in constitutional review 
in the Common Law jurisdictions is an issue distinct from the validity of the impugned state 
act.52  To make sense of how novel a suspended declaration of invalidity is, the dual 
structure of validity judgment and remedy in constitutional adjudication holds the key.   
As Chief Justice Marshall emphasized in Marbury v. Madison, considering the 
constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law,”53 “an act of the [l]egislature repugnant 
to the Constitution is void.”54  A state act that is incompatible with the constitution is thus 
“unconstitutional and void.”55  The link between constitutional incompatibility and legal 
voidness has cast a long shadow on the Common Law approach to constitutional review.  
Finding an impugned state act incompatible with the constitution leads to its invalidation in 
the Common Law jurisdictions where constitutional review has recently been installed.  For 
example, in Canada, the legal basis of making judicial declarations of invalidity is attributed 
to the provision of constitutional supremacy.56  
On the face of it, this seems to reflect the conceptual approach to the unconstitutionality 
of state acts in the Civilian-Continental model as discussed above.  On closer examination, 
however, the distinctiveness of the Common Law model will become clear.  First, though 
Marbury declares that “an act of the [l]egislature repugnant to the Constitution is void,”57 it 
does not suggest a real concept of statutes void ab initio.  Rather, the impugned state act is 
valid until held unconstitutional in specific cases.  Paralleling the precedential, i.e., 
forward-looking effect of the holding of unconstitutionality, prior actions (especially already 
                                                
51 DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 94; Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Background of Marbury v. Madison, in 
ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON, supra note 2, at 47, 52-53; see also LECKEY, supra note 3, at 56-63. 
52 See Fish, supra note 8, at 330; see also Miller & Devins, supra note 6, at 153.  
53 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
54 Id. 
55 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 436 (1819). 
56 The Constitution Act 1982 s. 52 (1) provides “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, 
and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of 
no force or effect.”  See also LECKEY, supra note 3, at 103; Roach, supra note 8, at 546; Sarah Burningham, A 
Comment on the Court’s Decision to Suspend the Declaration of Invalidity in Carter v. Canada, 78 
SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 201, 201 (2015). 
57 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
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adjudicated ones) that were taken on the basis of the impugned state act would not be 
affected as a result of a declaration of unconstitutionality. 58   This limited effect of 
unconstitutionality distinguishes the Common Law tradition from the prototype of the 
Civilian-Continental model under which a declaration of unconstitutionality would lead 
logically to the impugned state act’s ex tunc invalidation.59   
Second, under the Common Law model of constitutional review, a declaration of 
invalidity actually plays a double role: a declaration of invalidity is not only a judgment as to 
the (un)constitutionality of the impugned state act (A) but also a remedy in response to the 
unconstitutional state act (B).  To put it differently, a declaration of invalidity is essentially 
a judicial order that is issued to remedy an impugned state act that is declared 
unconstitutional (A) with the measure of invalidation or nullification (B).  Moreover, as 
invalidation has been habitually chosen as the judicial remedy in cases concerning the 
non-constitutional judicial review of the compatibility of subordinate legislation with a 
parental statute,60 the dual character of declarations of invalidity in constitutional review has 
thus been eclipsed.  Yet, when the supposed invalidation effect that results from an 
impugned state act found unconstitutional in a declaration of invalidity becomes problematic, 
the foregoing dual character of the declaration of invalidity has resurfaced in the 
differentiating responses in constitutional decisions.  While a judgment of the 
unconstitutionality of the constitution still results in a judicial declaration of invalidity (or 
nullity), the legal effects of such a declaration become a question of remedy choice to be 
addressed separately.  In this light, the emphasis seems to be shifting from the equation of 
unconstitutionality with invalidity in the judgment of the impugned state act’s constitutional 
conformity to the consideration as to whether a declaration of invalidity is the best judicial 
remedy for unconstitutionality in individual cases.61   
                                                
58 I am indebted to Mark Tushnet for a detailed comment on the distinctiveness of the Common Law model 
of constitutional review, especially in the US. 
59 See supra text accompanying notes 28-36. 
60 Such practices, which had long existed in the several Common Law countries, are considered the source 
of inspiration for their formal adoption of constitutional review.  See LECKEY, supra note 3, at 56-63. 
61 Id. at 115-22; Yap, supra note 8, at 30; Roach & Budlender, supra note 8; Burningham, supra note 56, at 
202; see also TUSHNET, supra note 49, at 247-50. 
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As noted above, constitutional review in the Common Law tradition is concrete and 
centers on individual cases with emphasis on the vindication of individual rights.62  Seen in 
this light, contextualized responses (including suspension orders) are not foreign to judicial 
remedy for the constitutional invalidity of the impugned state act.63  Thanks to the equitable 
and discretionary character of the law of judicial remedy in the Common Law tradition,64 
responses to the legal effects of declarations of invalidity in constitutional review have been 
characterized by judicial creativity.  Combined with other remedial measures, declarations 
of invalidity have adopted unconventional and complex forms.  The granting of a remedial 
grace period is merely a technical choice among the various skills of judicial remedy in 
response to the invalidity of the impugned state act.65  With a remedial grace period granted, 
the effects of the declaration of invalidity are suspended, leaving the enforceability of the 
impugned state act unaltered during the grace period.  The granting of remedial grace 
periods in constitutional review in the Common Law jurisdictions gives rise to the remedial 
form of suspended declarations of invalidity.        
With the dual character of declarations of invalidity disclosed, answers to the questions 
put forward earlier also become clear.  The legal effect of granting a grace period to a 
declaration of invalidity—the suspension of the declaration of invalidity—is novel as it 
results in the situation of unconstitutional state acts remaining in force in jurisdictions rooted 
in the Common Law tradition.  Yet, situated in the Common Law tradition of discretionary 
and equitable judicial remedy, remedial grace periods can be seen as a contextualized remedy 
choice.  From this perspective, the granting of remedial grace periods is not as 
unconventional as it appears.   
To sum up, under the Common Law tradition that remedy choice stands apart from the 
judgment of (in)validity/ (un)constitutionality, the granting of remedial grace periods has 
been virtually absorbed into the question of judicial remedy with the dual character of 
declarations of invalidity obscured.  Drawing heavily on the recent experience of 
                                                
62 DE VISSER, supra note 3, at 97; TUSHNET, supra note 49, at 247.  
63 But cf. Fish, supra note 8, at 347-73; TUSHNET, supra note 49, at 247. 
64 Fish, supra note 8, at 329-33; Roach & Budlender, supra note 8, at 325-27 and n. 6.   
65 See Roach & Budlender, supra note 8; TUSHNET, supra note 49, at 248-49; see also Fish, supra note 8. 
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constitutional review in the Common Law jurisdictions, current literature tends to 
characterize it as a novel judicial remedy choice in the form of the suspension order as to the 
declaration of invalidity.66  Framed this way, the granting of remedial grace periods is tied 
to declarations of invalidity, regardless of whether it is prescribed in a suspension order 
simpliciter or in its augmented edition, i.e., a suspension order with bite.  As a result, the 
potential functions of grace periods in constitutional review beyond suspending declarations 
of invalidity are not given due attention.   
Before proceeding to the case study, it will help to reflect on the use of remedial grace 
periods in constitutional review by juxtaposing the Common Law model with its 
Civilian-Continental counterpart.  It is true that remedial grace periods emerge in the 
judicial management of the consequences of unconstitutional state acts in both models of 
constitutional review.  Nevertheless, juxtaposed with the Common Law model, the 
Civilian-Continental model shows that the granting of remedial grace periods does not 
necessarily give rise to the state of suspended declarations of invalidity.  This suggests the 
wider role of remedial grace periods in the management of unconstitutionality than has been 
contended in the existing Common Law model-based scholarship.  In the following, Taiwan 
is to be closely studied to shed light on why the full potential of remedial grace periods can 
only be appreciated by taking account of legal tradition and the political landscape in which a 
constitutional jurisdiction is situated.     
III. REMEDIAL GRACE PERIODS IN THE TCC CASE LAW: A 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS  
Deferring the question of why the TCC has turned to remedial grace periods to Part IV, 
this Part presents an observation of the TCC’s granting of remedial grace periods in practice 
to illustrate the manifold functions of remedial grace periods.  In the first place, I offer an 
overview of the use of remedial grace periods in the TCC case law.  Besides indicating the 
TCC’s growing trend toward remedial grace periods in its unconstitutionality judgments, I 
                                                
66 See sources cited in supra note 8. 
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shall point out that not all the TCC judgements attached with a remedial grace period can be 
classified as suspension orders.  Instead, they need to be further differentiated in terms of 
the distinction between incompatibility and invalidity.  Following the overview, I provide a 
tripartite typology of the TCC judgements accompanied by a remedial grace period in terms 
of the function of granting grace periods in the TCC constitutional jurisprudence.         
A. More than Suspension Orders: An Overview of the TCC’s Use of 
Remedial Grace Periods 
In its seventy years of existence, the TCC has issued 774 interpretations.67  Since 
Interpretation No. 218 issued in 1987,68 the TCC’s first use of a remedial grace period, the 
TCC has granted remedial grace periods eighty-six times in total.69  All of them were 
                                                
67 The TCC was inaugurated in 1948.  Statistics concerning the TCC case law referred to infra are based on 
the case law as of December 31, 2018. For the explanation, see supra note 15.  Until the end of the Fourth 
Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan in September 1985, only 199 interpretations were promulgated.  
A terminological note is due.  The Judicial Yuan is the umbrella governing body of judicial administration, 
which is one of the five highest constitutional powers under Taiwan’s quintpartite separation of powers system.  
The Judicial Yuan exercises constitutional review in the form of the Council of Grand Justices, which is 
popularly known as the TCC.  The Council of Grand Justices is set to be replaced by the Constitutional 
Tribunal when the new Constitutional Litigation Act comes into effect on January 3, 2022.  See also Tzu-Yi 
Lin et al., Seventy Years On: The Taiwan Constitutional Court and Judicial Activism in a Changing 
Constitutional Landscape, 48 HONG KONG L.J. 995, 1023 & n. 140 (2018).  For an introduction to the current 
judicial organization in Taiwan, see generally Wen-Chen Chang, Courts and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: 
Gradual Transformations towards the Guardian of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS IN 
CONTEXT 143, 145-51 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014).   
68 In Interpretation No. 217, which was issued just two days after martial law being formally lifted on July 
15, 1987, the TCC upheld an interpretive circular issued by the Ministry of Finance.  I further discuss the 
significance of Interpretation No. 218 in Part IV, infra. 
69 Interpretation Nos. 261, 282, 599, and 631 are excluded for the following reasons.  As regards 
Interpretation Nos. 261 and 282, some scholars include both in the studies of “judicial deadline.”  See, e.g., 
JIUNN-RONG YEH, DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ch. 8 (2003) (in Chinese); 
WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS 455 (2014).  I exclude them 
in the discussion of remedial grace periods as it is questionable whether the deadlines set in those two 
interpretations are remedial in character.  Interpretation No. 261 (1990) ordered the members of the First 
Parliament Legislative Yuan elected in 1947 and 1948 to vacate their parliamentary seats by December 31, 
1991 and thereby resolved the foremost political issue in Taiwan’s democratization.  See Lin et al., supra note 
67, at 1011.  Given that the very long First Parliament was also ordered to close in December 1992, the 
deadline imposed in Interpretation No. 261 was more of part of the TCC’s constitutional disapproval of those 
parliamentarians serving for decades on end since the elections of 1947 and 1948 than a remedial grace period.  
As regards Interpretation No. 282 (1991), it is essentially the postponement of Interpretation No. 282 itself 
instead of a remedial grace period corresponding to a judgment of unconstitutionality.  With respect to 
Interpretation No. 599 (2005), a preliminary junction decision in relation to Interpretation No. 603 (2005), it is 
an instance of what Neal Katyal calls “judicial sunset.”  See Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 
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attached to unconstitutionality judgments concerning the political branch’s acts, including 
statutes and administrative rules.  The proportion of the interpretations attached with a 
remedial grace period to the entire TCC case law is inconspicuous but deceptive, falling far 
short of reflecting its role in the TCC approach to constitutional review in practice.  Thus, as 
will be further discussed in Part IV, the better foil for the role of remedial grace periods in 
the TCC jurisprudence is the TCC’s interpretations issued after its formative stage (1948-85) 
when the influential Fifth Council of Grand Justices (of the Judicial Yuan) (hereinafter the 
Fifth Council) assumed office in October 1985.70  Since then, the TCC has issued 574 
interpretations, approximately 15% of which included a remedial grace period.  As a 
remedial grace period must be prescribed to redress the unconstitutionality judgment as to 
state acts, the percentage substantially changes when compared to the TCC’s 
unconstitutionality judgments in its post-formative stage: 39% (86/223).  Moreover, when 
we exclude those judgements concerning advisory opinion referrals and unconstitutional 
judicial precedents (or interpretations) and focus on the TCC’s judgments as to the 
constitutionality of the political branch’s acts,71 the real face of the TCC’s use of remedial 
grace periods is unveiled.  Among the 191 judgements that declare the invalidity or 
incompatibility of the political branch’s acts, 86 (45%) are attached with a remedial grace 
period.72 
                                                                                                                                                  
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1244-47 (2004).  It is also noteworthy that Interpretation No. 631 (2007) seems to 
prescribe a remedial grace period in correspondence to the effective date of the prospective legislative 
amendment to the Communications Privacy Act, the repealed provision of which was declared invalid by the 
TCC.  Given that the impugned statutory provision had already been amended, Interpretation No. 631 was 
only rendered so that the petitioner could request retrial on the decision.  Thus, the grace period was not 
remedial but to be synchronized with the legislatively designated effective date of the statutory amendment.  
Taken as a whole, Interpretation No. 631 amounts to the TCC’s endorsement of the statutory amendment.  For 
these reasons, I exclude Interpretation No. 631 as well.  
70 For the relationship between the Council of Grand Justices and the TCC, see supra note 67. 
71 Apart from constitutional interpretations, the TCC has jurisdiction over “unification interpretation.”  For 
the distinction between constitutional and unification interpretation in the TCC’s jurisdictions, see Jau-Yuan 
Hwang et al., “The Clouds Are Gathering”: Developments in Taiwanese Constitutional Law — The Year 2016 
in Review, 15 INT’L J. CON. L. 753, 755-56 (2017).  For the present purposes, I exclude unification 
interpretations from my discussion of the TCC’s approach to constitutional remedies. 
72 Interpretation No. 535 (2001) is ambiguous.  The TCC was ambivalent on the constitutionality of the 
impugned Policing Act as the TCC seemed to suggest that the impugned statute was barely constitutional only 
when several provisions of the impugned statute were read down.  Even so, the TCC prescribed a remedial 
grace period of two years and admonished the political branch to amend the Policing Act, though the TCC fell 
short of declaring it incompatible with the constitution.  Strictly speaking, Interpretation No. 535 was an 
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 [Table 1] 
(1) Period 
(2) 
Total 
Interpretations 
(3) 
Cases  Declared 
Unconstitutional 
(4) 
Cases 
Prescribed 
with a Grace 
Period 
(5) 
Percentage 
(6) 
[(5) ÷ (4)] 
5th Council  
 
10.01.1985 – 
09.30.1994 
167 28 9 32% 
6th Council 
 
10.01.1994 – 
09.30.2003 
200 65 22 34% 
Yueh-sheng 
Weng Court 
10.01.2003 – 
09.30.2007 
67 26 8 33% 
In-jaw Lai 
Court 
10.01.2007 – 
10.01.2010 
48 25 17 68% 
Hau-min Rai 
Court  
10.13.2010 – 
10.31.2016 
59 31 19 61% 
Tzong-li Hsu 
Court  
11.01.2016 – 
12.31.2018 
33 16 11 69% 
Notes: From October 1, 2003 on, Grand Justices have been appointed to staggered terms of eight 
years (except half of those who were appointed in 2003 for a four-year term, including 
President-Grand Justice Yueh-Sheng Weng).  “Cases” in (4) and (5) columns only include the state 
acts of the political branch, namely, statutes and administrative rules. 
 
 
As noted above, the TCC first included a remedial grace period in Interpretation No. 
218 in the early years of the Fifth Council.  During that term (October 1985—September 
1994), the TCC issued 167 interpretations in total, 28 of which were unconstitutionality 
judgments on the political branch’s acts that included a remedial grace period.73  During the 
Sixth Council (October 1994—September 2003), the TCC issued 65 unconstitutionality 
judgments on the political branch’s acts that included a remedial grace period among the 200 
interpretations issued.74  With the Sixth Council replaced by the Grand Justices appointed to 
staggered terms of eight years,75 however, the use of remedial grace periods has soared.  
From October 2003 on, over 56% (55/98) of unconstitutionality judgments on the political 
                                                                                                                                                  
“admonitory decision” (Appellentscheidung) proper rather than a declaration of incompatibility, at least in form.  
Thus, I include Interpretation No. 535 in my count of the TCC interpretations that make declarations of 
invalidity or incompatibility with a remedial grace period prescribed. 
73 Interpretation Nos. 200-366 were issued during the Fifth Council. 
74 Interpretation Nos. 367-566 were issued during the Sixth Council. 
75 JIUNN-RONG YEH, THE CONSTITUTION OF TAIWAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 160 (2016). 
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branch’s acts have included a remedial grace period.76 
Moreover, as indicated in Table 1, the recent rise of the TCC’s use of remedial grace 
periods has more to do with personnel composition than the change on the terms of Grand 
Justices.  2007 was the year when President-Grand Justice Yueh-Sheng WENG (翁岳生), 
the last holdover from the Fifth Council, during the term of which remedial grace periods 
were initially adopted, retired from the TCC.  Before he left the TCC, remedial grace 
periods appeared thirty-nine times over a span of twenty-two years.  Since President-Grand 
Justice Weng’s retirement in 2007, the TCC has issued another forty-seven interpretations 
attached with a remedial grace period just for over a decade.   
Apart from the recent increasing use of remedial grace periods, the TCC case law 
suggests that a declaration of unconstitutionality attached with a remedial grace period does 
not necessarily point in the direction of “suspension orders” that delay the invalidation of the 
impugned state act.77  As the foregoing discussion of the Civilian-Continental model shows, 
while remedial grace periods are prescribed in declarations of incompatibility (vis-à-vis 
invalidity), their legal effects depend on the varying judicial orders.  In contrast, the TCC 
has further prescribed remedial grace periods in declarations of invalidity.  Even so, 
informed by the GFCC doctrinal distinction between incompatibility and invalidity under the 
concept of unconstitutionality, the TCC carefully distinguished between declarations of 
incompatibility and those of invalidity in its interpretations where a grace period was 
granted.78  Should the impugned state act remain unchanged after the prescribed grace 
period elapses, a declaration of incompatibility attached with such a grace period will not 
affect that state act’s legal effects.  In other words, a remedial grace period does not suspend 
or delay the TCC’s declaration of incompatibility as such a declaration does not affect the 
                                                
76 The first interpretation issued by the TCC staffed with Grand Justices appointed to staggered terms is 
Interpretation No. 567 (2003).   
77 Yap, supra note 8.  For the impact of the recent Interpretations Nos. 725 and 741 on the judicial 
enforceability of the law that was declared invalid with a remedial grace period attached, see CHANG ET AL., 
supra note 69, at 761. 
78 Yueh-Sheng Weng (翁岳⽣), Guardian of Constitution: Reflection and Expectation, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, VOL. VI (PART I) 1, 31 n. 94 (Fort Fu-Te Liao ed., 2009) (in 
Chinese). 
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legal validity of the impugned state act.  Thus, not all the eighty-six interpretations where a 
remedial grace period is granted are suspended declarations of invalidity.  Specifically, 
while seventy interpretations are suspended declarations of invalidity, others are declarations 
or admonitions of incompatibility attached with a remedial grace period having different 
legal implications, to which I shall shortly turn next. 
Before proceeding, a methodological and definitional note is due.  In contrast to the 
GFCC, the TCC has followed a much gentler approach when it condemned the impugned 
state act’s unconstitutionality, regardless of whether the condemned act was invalidated or 
not. 79   As a result, it requires discerning the code phrases chosen by the TCC to 
communicate the judgment of incompatibility, including “not entirely compatible” (未盡相
符) and “compatible with the constitution only if…” (…始與憲法相符), and that of 
invalidity, including “invalid” (失其效力) and “inoperative” (停止適用).80  For this reason, 
some of the TCC’s declarations of incompatibility are hardly distinguishable from its 
“admonitory decisions” (Appellentscheidungen), which in German law are considered to be 
holding the impugned state acts constitutional albeit with warnings about the defects that 
need to be rectified to avoid constitutional condemnation in the future.81  Given the seeming 
extension of admonitory decisions to those declaring the impugned state act incompatible or 
issuing judicial advice as to the required reform,82 I choose the term admonitions of 
incompatibility in the place of declarations of incompatibility when discussing the TCC case 
law.83  In addition, to determine the TCC’s intention as to incompatibility, invalidity, or just 
admonition, not only the holding but also the reasoning needs to be carefully examined.84  
 
                                                
79 I shall further discuss this legacy from its early case law during the martial-law era in Part IV.A., infra. 
80 Weng, supra note 78, at 29-30. 
81 Rupp-v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 395-99. 
82 Id. at 388-95; see also GFCC, supra note 21, at 41. 
83 Interpretation No. 535 (2001) illustrates the TCC’s ambivalence about admonitory decisions.  For the 
ambiguities surrounding Interpretation No. 535, see supra note 72. 
84 Interpretation No. 549 (2002) is thus classified as a proper declaration of incompatibility with a remedial 
grace period, even though the TCC only intimated its unconstitutionality judgment in the reasoning.  The 
official English translation misses the genuine meaning of Interpretation No. 549 in its Chinese original. 
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B. Between Dialogue and Directive: Toward a Functional Typology 
Echoing literature on dialogical judicial review in comparative constitutional law,85 
some scholars have interpreted the granting of remedial periods as part of the TCC’s grand 
strategy to engage the political branch in an institutional dialogue aimed at the cooperative 
solution to unconstitutional state acts.86  Departing from this dialogical view, I suggest that 
the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods be divided into three types: bridging, nudging, and 
hedging.  In the first type, the granting of remedial grace periods essentially provides the 
doctrinal bridge for the TCC to move toward a normal constitutional court that can realize its 
institutional potential to strike down the political branch’s unconstitutional acts.  In the 
second type, the granting of remedial grace periods is meant to focus public attention on the 
TCC’s judgment of or admonition about the unconstitutionality of the impugned state act, 
thereby nudging the political branch to rectify it but without affecting its validity.  In the 
third type, the TCC further buttresses its nudging judgments with suspended interim 
measures to hedge against the constitutional risk of political inaction at the elapse of the 
remedial grace period.  As the temporal sequence of the TCC’s use of remedial grace 
periods suggests, the development of bridging, nudging, and hedging reflects the TCC’s 
move from institutional dialogue to constitutional directive in prodding the political branch to 
effectively rectify the declared unconstitutional acts.        
1. Bridging: Suspended Declarations of Invalidity  
Of the eighty-six interpretations attached with remedial grace periods, seventy were 
suspended declarations of invalidity in terms of comparative constitutional law, or as I call it, 
“bridging” judgment. 87   As will be further discussed, the first bridging judgment 
                                                
85 E.g., Roach, supra note 8; Roach & Budlender, supra note 8. 
86 E.g., Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Politics of Unconstitutionality: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Deadlines 
and Political Compliance in Taiwan, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 2011 1, 15-20 
(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2013) (in Chinese). 
87 They are Interpretation Nos. 218, 224, 251, 289, 300, 313, 324, 365, 366, 367, 373, 380, 384, 390, 392, 
402, 423, 436, 443, 450, 452, 454, 491, 523, 551, 573, 580, 586, 588, 598, 613, 616, 619, 636, 638, 640, 641, 
645, 649, 654, 657, 658, 663, 664, 666, 669, 670, 677, 680, 687, 694, 696, 702, 704, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 
716, 718, 724, 730, 731, 733, 734, 739, 749, 756, and 765.      
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Interpretation No. 218, which concerned an administrative rule, was issued in August 1987 
when martial law had just been lifted a month ago.  Soon it extended to the invalidation of 
statutes.  A notable early example was Interpretation No. 251 issued in 1990, which was a 
sequel to Interpretation No. 166 issued in 1980.  With an eighteen-month grace period,88 
the TCC finally gave meaning to the toothless Interpretation No. 166 in Interpretation No. 
251, ending the condemned long life of the Police Punishment Act.89  Since then, bridging 
has been widely used.  It has been applied to both statutes and administrative rules 
concerning a wide range of issues, including the equal parental rights under the Civil Code,90 
the judicial due process for pre-trial detention and other enforcement measures under the Criminal 
Procedures Act,91 the judicial review of martial-court decisions under the Martial Court 
Procedures Act, 92  the right to freedom of assembly under the Assemblies and 
Demonstrations Act.93  In addition, the TCC has issued bridging judgments in relation to 
sundry administrative regulations.  Though a substantial proportion concerns taxes, 94 
bridging has been used to address the constitutional issues raised by various regulatory 
policies such as the administration of civil aviation,95 the suspension of containers depots,96 
the regulation of apothecary,97 land redevelopment,98 city general planning,99 benefits for 
school teachers,100 and immigration and border control.101 
Generally speaking, the remedial grace period the TCC prescribed in bridging 
judgments ranged from six months to two years.  Although the TCC tended to grant the 
political branch longer remedial grace periods in the cases concerning statutes than those 
                                                
88 Interpretation No. 251, issued on January 19, 1990, declared the Police Punishment Act unconstitutional 
and invalid from July 1, 1991.  
89 The TCC first intimated that the Police Punishment Act was unconstitutional in Interpretation No. 166 
(1980).  I shall further discuss Interpretation Nos. 166 and 251 in Part IV.A., infra. 
90 Interpretation No. 365 (1993). 
91 Interpretation No. 392 (1995). 
92 Interpretation No. 436 (1997). 
93 Interpretation No. 718 (2014). 
94 E.g., Interpretation Nos. 218, 224, 289, 367, 616, 640, 641, 657, 663, 687, 694, and 696.  
95 Interpretation No. 313 (1993). 
96 Interpretation No. 324 (1993). 
97 Interpretation No. 711 (2013). 
98 Interpretation No. 739 (2016). 
99 Interpretation No. 709 (2013). 
100 Interpretation No. 707 (2012). 
101 Interpretation Nos. 708 (2013) and 710 (2013). 
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about administrative rules, how the TCC decided on the length of remedial grace periods in 
individual cases was not clear.102  Moreover, there were some conspicuous exceptions.  
For example, Interpretation No. 677 gave the political branch only two weeks to respond to 
the declared invalidity of a statutory provision that stipulated that a prisoner be released by 
noon of the next calendar day following the end date of her prison sentence.103  Obviously, 
the short remedial grace period was not issued to solicit legislative response but to allow the 
correctional facilities to make corresponding arrangements. 104   Another outlier was 
Interpretation No. 613 regarding the National Communications Commission (NCC) Act 
according to which the independent NCC was created, despite the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP)-controlled Executive’s objections. 105   Considering the politically charged 
context of Interpretation No. 613, the TCC unusually gave the opposition-controlled 
Legislative Yuan twenty-nine months to rectify the impugned statute, which effectively 
allowed the unconstitutional NCC to sit out the DPP presidential term.106 
It is noteworthy that not all the seventy bridging judgments are genuine bridging or 
suspended declarations of invalidity.  Rather, some of them are bridging in form only.  
Instead, those judgments are effectively “reading down” or “reading in” interpretations.107  
Take Interpretation No. 373 for example.  In this judgment, the statutory ban on the 
unionization of employees in the education sector was formally declared invalid, with a 
one-year grace period attached, to the extent that the ban unconstitutionally included 
technicians (技工) and laborers (工友).108  As a result, the political branch simply left the 
                                                
102 See YEH, supra note 69, at 334; Weng, supra note 78, at 37. 
103 Interpretation No. 677 (2010).  As the case concerned unlawful imprisonment to the extent that the 
prisoner was imprisoned beyond the end date of her prison sentence according to the impugned provision of the 
Prison Act, the TCC also mandated an interim measure before the expiry of the two-week grace period.  
According to the TCC-mandated interim measure, the prisoners shall be released by noon instead of midnight 
on the end date of her prison sentence.  The exceptional TCC-mandated interim measure will be further 
discussed in Part III.B.3., infra.  
104 This parallels Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976)), which set a grace period of thirty days to allow the 
Federal Election Commission to exercise its powers. Fish, supra note 8, at 360 n. 184.   
105 Interpretation No. 613 (2007).   
106 For further discussion of the political background of Interpretation No. 613 (2007), see Ming-Sung Kuo, 
Moving towards a Nominal Constitutional Court? Critical Reflections on the Shift from Judicial Activism to 
Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 597, 617-19 (2016). 
107 Such ostensibly bridging judgments include Interpretation Nos. 373, 704, and 718. 
108 Interpretation No. 373 (1995). 
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impugned statutory provision unchanged as it would cease applying to technicians or laborers 
in the education sector after one year from the promulgation of Interpretation No. 373.109  
As will be discussed shortly, Interpretation No. 373 was a “hedging” judgment in essence as 
the TCC actually hedged its judgment against the risk of the political branch’s 
non-compliance with the remedy of its own choosing in the same judgment.     
More important, the example of Interpretation No. 373 illustrated the fundamental 
question: How responsive has the political branch been to the TCC’s bridging judgments?  
Taking into account the ostensible bridging judgments,110 the total number of the lapse of the 
impugned statutes or administrative rules because of the political branch’s failure to respond 
is twenty-one.111  In other words, around 30% (21/70) of the bridging judgments have failed 
to solicit timely effective responses from the political branch.112  As a result, the state of 
unconstitutionality in those cases was only resolved with the lapse of the impugned state acts.  
If bridging was aimed to solicit legislative or administrative responses to resolve the state of 
unconstitutionality,113 the above record was not very encouraging.  There may be different 
reasons for the political branch not to act.  As the ostensible bridging judgment of 
Interpretation No. 373 suggests, the political branch’s inertia could be attributed to the TCC’s 
directive-like interventions.  In ostensible bridging judgments, the political branch did not 
                                                
109 The right to unionize in the education sector was formally recognized in 2010. 
110 See supra note 107. 
111 By failure to respond, I refer to the lapse of the impugned state acts at the end of the prescribed remedial 
grace period, even though the political branch reacted later or with stopgap measures as Interpretation No. 718 
illustrated.  The cases of lapse are Interpretation Nos. 218, 313, 366, 373, 380, 390, 402, 450, 573, 580, 586, 
640, 654, 657, 677, 696, 704, 718, 731, 733, and 734.  If we include the examples of statutory or regulatory 
amendments promulgated after the elapse of the prescribed remedial grace period due to procedural delay 
(Interpretation Nos. 300, 523, and 598), the number will reach 24.  In an empirical evidence-based analysis, 
Jiunn–rong Yeh notes that during the period 1987-September 30, 2011, the political branch amended the 
condemned statutes within the TCC-prescribed grace period around 67%.  Yeh, supra note 86, at 21.  Yet, it 
is unclear how that percentage was calculated as Yeh did not explain or list the cases concerned.  It is also 
worth pointing out that Yeh did not distinguish between bridging and nudging judgments.     
112 How the political branch will respond to Interpretation Nos. 749, 756, and 765 remains unclear as their 
corresponding remedial grace period has not elapsed.    
113 The rare examples in the US Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest two contrasting functions of remedial 
grace periods.  In contrast to the purpose of granting a one-month grace period in Buckley v. Valeo to allow the 
Federal Election Commission to exercise power, the US Supreme Court granted a three-month grace period in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co v. Marathon Pipe Line Co (458 U.S. 50 (1982)) to solicit legislative 
response to rectify the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.  Unfortunately, Northern Pipeline proved to be a 
disappointing experiment with the legislative response-soliciting remedial grace periods in the US.  See Fish, 
supra note 8, at 360-62.   
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have much incentive to act as no legal vacuum would occur thanks to the TCC’s reading 
down or reading in.  Yet, this also calls the wisdom of bridging into question.  As the 
twenty-odd lapse cases suggested, the political branch did not seem to be always concerned 
about the eventual lapse of the impugned state acts as the rationale of bridging assumed.  
Against that backdrop, the concerns behind the TCC’s wide use of bridging became 
clear.  Though the seventy bridging judgments covered a wide range of subjects, they were 
mainly concerned with the restriction of civil rights and liberties.114  Even so, over 41% 
(29/70) of bridging judgments declared the political branch’s impugned acts invalid 
according to the constitutional doctrine of “statutory reservation” (Rechtsvorbehalt) under the 
formal rule of law (Rechtsstaat) principle to the effect that the impugned rights-infringing 
administrative rule was ultra vires or rendered so because of insufficient statutory basis.115  
For the twenty-nine cases in which the political branch’s acts were condemned for the breach 
of the constitutional doctrine of statutory reservation, the political branch could redress the 
constitutional wrong by simply giving the impugned administrative rule a statutory basis or 
even further to reconsider its substance.  Put differently, as the TCC came down on the 
political branch only for the reasons of the formal rule of law principle in those twenty-nine 
interpretations, its adoption of bridging judgments reflected its restraint from getting 
involved in the substance of the impugned acts.   
It is true that legal certainty has carried considerable weight with the TCC in 
bridging.116  Yet, it was not the only value in the TCC’s calculation.  As the TCC noted, 
bridging judgments enabled itself to strike the hoped-for balance between legal certainty and 
other constitutional values.  With a grace period granted, the political branch could review 
                                                
114 Cf. Yeh, supra note 86, at 17-18. 
115 The twenty-nine bridging judgments concerned are Interpretation Nos. 218, 289, 313, 324, 367, 380, 390, 
402, 423, 443, 454, 491, 586, 598, 619, 638, 640, 657, 658, 680, 707, 710, 711, 724, 730, 734, 739, 756 and 
765.  For a discussion of the relationship between “statutory reservation” and the rule of law principle, see 
Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the European Union and 
the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 242 (2010).   
116  Jau-Yuan Hwang, Unconstitutional But Not Invalid: A Reappraisal of the TCC Judgments on 
Unconstitutional Statues and Administrative Rules, No 262 TAIWAN L.J. 39 (2014) (in Chinese). 
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substantive constitutional values without being pushed by judicial fiat,117 only the record 
suggests that the TCC’s bridging judgments did not always bear fruit.  Instead of taking a 
substantive review of the impugned act proactively, the political branch actually allowed the 
prescribed grace period to elapse in eight cases decided on the bases of statutory reservation, 
including Interpretation No. 218, the first bridging judgment.118  In view of such mixed 
experience, the TCC tweaked bridging in face of new constitutional challenges, to which 
now I turn.   
2. Nudging: Emphatic Admonitions of Incompatibility 
Although the TCC’s first experience with remedial grace periods was not particularly 
reassuring as suggested in the political branch’s mixed response to the bridging judgements, 
bridging remained the TCC’s handy weapon to make a constitutional strike.  Should the 
political branch fail to respond by the end of the prescribed remedial grace period, just let the 
impugned act lapse.  So be it.  Nothing is worse than the continuing state of 
unconstitutionality. 
Yet, the TCC soon faced new constitutional issues for which lapse was not an option the 
TCC could afford.  Here came Interpretation No. 455, the first nudging judgment.  Until 
the TCC issued Interpretation No. 455 in 1998, it had made twenty-two bridging judgments 
since the remedial grace period was first adopted in 1987.119  Although seven of the first 
twenty-two bridging judgments had resulted in the lapse of the impugned state acts, this did 
not particularly trouble the TCC when the impugned state acts only concerned the restriction 
of civil rights and liberties.  Yet, it became a problem when the impugned state act provided 
the legal basis for beneficial entitlements.  Should it be allowed to lapse, the eligible 
beneficiaries would lose their legal entitlements.  Thus, to address issues concerning 
                                                
117 The TCC did not explain why the declaration of invalidity was suspended in the first bridging judgment 
Interpretation No. 218 (1987).  Yet, more than a generation later, it provided a retrospective justification in the 
reasoning of Interpretation No. 725 (2014) along the lines of thinking as noted above. 
118 The impugned interpretive circular lapsed on February 14, 1988 when the sixth-moth grace period ended 
while the Ministry of Finance incorporated its content into the Implementation Rule of the Income Tax Act on 
May 30, 1988. 
119 Interpretation No. 218 (1987). 
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differential treatment, Interpretation No. 455 only declared the impugned interpretive circular 
incompatible with the constitutional principle of equality and prescribed a one-year remedial 
grace period.  
In contrast to the TCC’s previous declarations of unconstitutionality, Interpretation No. 
455 had two features.  First, it was not a (suspended) declaration of invalidity as the 
impugned administrative act was only declared constitutionally incompatible.  With the 
elapse of the prescribed remedial grace period, the declared unconstitutional state act would 
have remained in force had the administration failed to respond.120  Second, Interpretation 
No. 455 was not just a traditional declaration of incompatibility or an admonitory decision 
proper.  Rather, with a remedial grace period attached to the declaration of incompatibility, 
it was aimed to bring the state of unconstitutionality resulting from the political branch’s act 
to the foreground of public attention.  With such a nudge, the TCC expected the political 
branch to act accordingly.121   
Since then, the TCC has issued nine nudging judgments in total.122  Although the TCC 
initially applied nudging to issues concerning equal treatment,123 it has extended it further to 
issues requiring structural adjustment, including the national health insurance plan,124 the 
organization of the Judicial Yuan,125 the statutory basis of policing activities,126 and the 
provision for judicial review of remand prisoners’ complaints.127  Apart from the first two 
nudging judgments that concerned administrative rules and the deviant Interpretation No. 
                                                
120 Although the TCC usually included legislative advice in its nudging judgments, it was not legally binding 
on the political branch.   
121 The then Senior Grand Justice Weng published one of his few concurring opinions to elucidate the TCC’s 
move from bridging to nudging in Interpretation No. 455 along these lines.  He further suggested that should 
the political branch fail to rectify constitutional flaws within the prescribed remedial grace period, the state 
would then incur liability and the courts could make remedial orders case by case.  Unfortunately, the TCC did 
not move in that direction in its subsequent nudging judgments.  
122 Interpretation Nos. 455, 457, 524, 530, 535, 549, 653, 745, and 760.  
123 Interpretation Nos. 455 and 457 were issued in 1998.  The TCC further issued three nudging judgments 
in this regard: Interpretation Nos. 549 (2002), 745 (2017), and 760 (2018).       
124 Interpretation No. 524 (2001). 
125 Interpretation No. 530 (2001). 
126 Interpretation No. 535 (2001). 
127 Interpretation No. 653 (2008). 
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760,128 all the other six interpretations required statutory amendment.  For this reason, the 
TCC prescribed a two-year remedial grace period in those six cases while requesting the 
administration to change the impugned administrative rules within six months in other 
nudging judgments.  Yet, facing the TCC’s nudging, the political branch did not often 
budge. 
The record of how the political branch responded to the TCC’s nudging raised serious 
doubt about its wisdom.  The political branch responded to the first two nudging judgments 
in a timely and effective manner indeed.129  Yet, when it concerned issues concerning 
structural adjustment, nudging mostly fell short of moving the political branch.130  The first 
sign of trouble emerged from the first structural nudging judgment, Interpretation No. 524, 
which concerned the complex national health insurance plan.  Taiwan instituted national 
health insurance in 1994.  Before Interpretation No. 524 was issued in 2001, the TCC had 
issued an admonitory decision in 1999,131 requesting the political branch to address the 
concerns raised over some provisions of the National Health Insurance Act.  The political 
branch was unresponsive to the TCC’s admonition.  In its second encounter, the TCC made 
a declaration of incompatibility with respect to other provisions of the National Health 
Insurance Act and prescribed the political branch to rectify its constitutional flaws as well as 
address the issues raised in its 1999 admonitory decision within two years.  Yet, it took the 
political branch almost another ten years to fully address the issues raised in both 
judgments.132  In the event, the political branch did budge but only after the prescribed 
                                                
128 The latest nudging judgment, Interpretation No. 760 (2018), deviates from the previous ones in one 
important aspect.  Although what was found constitutionally incompatible is a statutory provision, the 
prescribed six-month grace period is concerned with the remedial measures expected of the administrative 
departments involved. 
129 Interpretation Nos. 455 and 457.  A more recent example falling in this line is Interpretation No. 745 
(2017).  The impugned statutory provision was amended one year before the expiry of the two-year grace 
period. 
130 The exception was Interpretation No. 535 (2001) concerning the statutory basis of policing activities.  
Still, it is noteworthy that in this admonitory decision, the TCC read in the proportionality principle with respect 
to the core provision of the impugned Policing Act.  In response to Interpretation No. 535, the political branch 
left that core provision unchanged in the new statute. 
131 Interpretation No. 472 (1999). 
132 The National Health Insurance Act and the delegated administrative rules had been amended several 
times after Interpretation No. 524 (2001).  Yet, those amendments did not satisfy all the requirements 
prescribed in Interpretation No. 524 until 2011.   
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grace period in nudging had expired. 
If Interpretation 524 fell short for it only solicited late responses from the political 
branch, the other structural nudging interpretations failed conspicuously.  In Interpretation 
No. 530, the TCC declared the existing Judicial Yuan, which had stood as the umbrella body 
of judicial administration since its reconstitution in 1947, 133  incompatible with the 
constitutional provision for the Judicial Yuan as the supreme judicial body and prescribed 
that the Judicial Yuan be reorganized accordingly through legislation within two years.  
Since its promulgation in 2001, the Judicial Yuan has remained as unconstitutional as it was 
over eighteen years ago.  
The political branch’s indifference to nudging in the foregoing two cases could be 
attributed to the broad ramifications from legal complexity or structural reorganization 
involved.  Yet, facing Interpretation No. 549 issued in 2002, the political branch was 
explicitly defiant.  Before the TCC were several provisions concerning the entitlement of 
the insured’s child to receive the insured’s payment under the Workers Insurance Act.  For 
reasons of moral hazard, the impugned statute imposed additional restrictions on the 
insured’s adopted child, which the TCC declared incompatible with the constitutional 
principle of equality.  Interpretation No. 549 nudged the political branch with a prescribed 
two-year remedial grace period to rectify it.  The political branch did not amend the 
impugned statute until 2008 when the grace period had already elapsed four years ago.  
Worse, the core provision (article 27), which the TCC declared constitutionally incompatible, 
was left unchanged.  Again nudging did not result in budging. 
The next nudging judgment, Interpretation No. 653 issued in 2008, was the last straw.  
Apart from the implicated structural adjustment, it concerned a core issue of civil rights and 
liberties: remand prisoners’ right to judicial review of complaints about their treatment under 
the pre-trial detention.  Though the Pre-Trial Detention Act provided for administrative 
review of such complaints, the TCC declared the impugned provision incompatible with the 
                                                
133 The current working constitution in Taiwan came into effect in 1947.  See YEH, supra note 75, at 29-32; 
see also Hwang et al., supra note 71, at 754-55. 
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constitutional requirement of judicial protection and prescribed the political branch to make 
provision for judicial review of remand prisoners’ complaints through legislation within two 
years.  Notably, the TCC did not issue a declaration of invalidity for fear of the lapse of the 
existing administrative review mechanism should the political branch fail to respond in time.  
Again the political branch did not budge and the unconstitutional deprivation of remand 
prisoners’ right to judicial review continued for another six years after the TCC’s nudging in 
2008.  It took another judicial intervention, Interpretation No. 720, to rectify the 
unconstitutional Pre-Trial Detention Act.134  Only this time, the TCC did not turn to a 
bridging judgment or a straightforward declaration of invalidity, let alone another nudging 
judgment.  Instead, Interpretation No. 720 itself made provision for judicial review of 
remand prisoner’s complaints by extending the Criminal Procedures Code to cases of 
pre-trial detention, paving the way for the TCC’s further tweak about the granting of 
remedial grace periods.   
Taken as a whole, nudging turns out to be the TCC’s disappointing experiment with the 
blending of different declarations of unconstitutionality with the granting of remedial grace 
periods, though it is not a total failure.  With the TCC’s intervention in constitutional issues 
requiring structural adjustment deepened, the political branch becomes more and more 
reluctant to budge in face of nudging judgments.  Apart from its early successes, nudging 
judgments are mostly tantamount to admonitions of incompatibility albeit with the emphatic  
note of a prescribed remedial grace period.     
3. Hedging: Nudging Buttressed with Suspended Interim Relief 
With the defects of nudging exposed in the interpretations as discussed above, the TCC 
was forced to mull over its choices.  If the disappointing nudging judgments failed for their 
falling short of a declaration of invalidity, reverting to bridging seemed to be the way out.  
Interpretation No. 707 was such an example.  Interpretation No. 707 issued in 2012 
concerned a non-statutory administrative rule regarding the benefits of school teachers.  
                                                
134 Interpretation No. 720 (2014). 
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Though it fell in line with the first nudging judgment as both concerned legal entitlements, 
the TCC departed for bridging this time.135  Notably, the TCC granted an unusually 
generous three-year remedial grace period so the political branch could provide for the 
required statutory framework, which was eventually legislated six months before the end of 
the prescribed grace period. 
Bridging could have been the TCC’s response to the political branch’s indifference to 
its nudging judgments.  Yet, the initial concerns behind the TCC’s move from bridging to 
nudging remained.  What if the political branch failed to respond to Interpretation No. 707?  
Would it have been better for the TCC to turn to bridging in the frustrated nudging judgment 
concerning judicial administration?  Had the political branch remained unresponsive to a 
bridging judgement in that case, would it be wise to let the Judicial Yuan’s unconstitutional 
organization collapse at the end of the prescribed remedial grace period?  All things 
considered, bridging was too risky to be applied to cases implicating structural adjustment or 
beneficial entitlements, even though Interpretation No. 707 turned out to be a success story in 
2015. 
With the result of Interpretation No. 707 still uncertain, the TCC issued the 
abovementioned Interpretation No. 720 in 2014 to realize the purpose of the nudging 
Interpretation No. 653 whose prescribed two-year remedial grace period had already elapsed 
in 2010.  The TCC imposed interim relief to rectify the constitutional flaws it had 
condemned in Interpretation No. 653 in 2008.  Taken together, Interpretation Nos. 653 and 
720 were not so much two separate interpretations as two parts of a single judgment: nudging 
followed by the TCC-prescribed interim relief six years later.  Down this road was the third 
type of the TCC’s applications of remedial grace periods: hedging, a nudging judgment 
buttressed with suspended interim relief. 
A thought experiment will help to see the distinctiveness of hedging judgements.  
Suppose Interpretation No. 653 had mandated the same interim relief the TCC later imposed 
                                                
135 Both Vice President-Grand Justice Yeong-Chin SU (蘇永欽) and Grand Justice Justice Chang-fa LO (羅
昌發) noted that Interpretation No. 707 was the first bridging interpretation concerning beneficial entitlements. 
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in Interpretation No. 720, alongside a declaration of incompatibility, but suspended the 
interim measures until after the political branch failed to provide the required constitutional 
redress within a grace period of six instead of two years.  The result of this hypothetical 
judgment would be exactly the same as the joint effect of Interpretation Nos. 653 and 720.  
In this hypothetical scenario, the TCC buttressed its nudging judgment with interim measures 
that would only be enforceable when the political branch failed to respond at the end of the 
prescribed remedial grace period.  In this way, the remedial grace period is not just be a 
legal technique to focus public attention.  Nor will it suspend the declaration of 
unconstitutionality as, strictly speaking, a declaration of incompatibility (mere 
unconstitutionality) implicates no legal effects that need to be suspended for reasons of legal 
certainty.  Rather, a remedial grace period granted in such judgments effectively suspends 
the prescribed interim measures, allowing the political branch the first say over how to 
rectify the constitutional wrong.  With interim measures prescribed but suspended until the 
end of the remedial grace periods, the TCC hedges its judgment against the political branch’s 
indifference to its emphatic admonitions or declarations of incompatibility in issues 
implicating structural adjustment or beneficial entitlements.  Here come the TCC’s hedging 
judgments. 
Since the TCC issued its first hedging judgment, Interpretation No. 737, in 2016, it has 
issued five interpretations that declare the impugned statutory provisions constitutionally 
incompatible and which are buttressed with suspended interim measures.136  All these five 
judgments concern statutory underinclusiveness. 137   Take the most famous hedging 
judgment, the Same-Sex Marriage Case,138 for example.  In this case, the TCC declares the 
marriage provisions in the Civil Code incompatible with the constitutional provisions for 
equal protection and freedom of marriage to the extent that the current Civil Code only 
provides for opposite-sex marriage.  Instead of striking down the existing marriage 
                                                
136 Interpretation Nos. 737, 742, 747, 748, and 762. 
137 See Miller & Devins, supra note 6, at 151. 
138 Interpretation No. 748 (2017).  See generally Ming-Sung Kuo & Hui-Wen Chen, The Brown Moment in 
Taiwan: Making Sense of the Law and Politics of the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case in a Comparative 
Light, 31 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 72 (2017).  For the post-Interpretation No. 748 politics about Taiwanese 
same-sex marriage legislation, see id. at 140-45; Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1020-22. 
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provisions, the TCC has granted the political branch a two-year grace period to redress the 
constitutional wrong.  Yet, mindful that the political branch may fail to respond 
accordingly, the TCC further provides for a suspended interim measure by decreeing that the 
current Civil Code will extend to same-sex couples at the expiry of the grace period.  
Obviously, a bridging judgment, not to mention a straightforward declaration of 
invalidity, was not the best way to address the condition of unconstitutionality in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case.  Had the case been decided in the form of a bridging judgment 
and should the marriage provisions lapse at the end of the remedial grace period, it would 
simply result in the dismantling of the entire marriage institution instead of realizing 
same-sex couples’ equal right to marriage.  To avoid such a scenario, the TCC only made a 
declaration of incompatibility as to the marriage provisions in the Civil Code.  At the same 
time, the TCC has prescribed and suspended interim relief to avoid repeating the mistakes it 
had made in the nudging judgments.  Seen in this light, hedging is an offshoot of nudging, 
not bridging. 
It is noteworthy that not all issues implicating structural adjustment or beneficial 
entitlements are suitable for a hedging judgment.  For example, it would be inconceivable 
for the TCC to prescribe how to deicide and calculate deductible cost and taxable income 
under the Income Tax Act on its own.139  In contrast, as the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
illustrates, hedging judgments have concerned the state of unconstitutionality resulting from 
the underinclusiveness of the impugned statutory provision.  In such cases, the TCC have 
prescribed interim relief by simply extending the impugned marriage provisions to same-sex 
couples. 
As noted above, hedging amounts to as an offshoot of nudging, or rather, nudging 
buttressed with suspended interim relief.  In line with this development, nudging can be 
even further fortified with immediate interim relief, giving rise to the augmented edition of 
hedging.  Interpretation No. 755 is such a case.140  At issue in this interpretation was the 
                                                
139 Interpretation No. 745 (2017) (a nudging judgment).   
140 Interpretation No. 755 (2017). 
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preclusion of judicial review of prisoners’ complaints about the administrative and 
disciplinary measures taken by the correctional facilities under the Prison Act and the 
corresponding enforcement rule.  The TCC declared the impugned statutory and regulatory 
provisions incompatible with the constitution to the extent that the measures taken by the 
correctional facilities infringed prisoners’ fundamental rights beyond the de minimis 
exception and were excluded from judicial review.  Paralleling the classical hedging 
judgments, this case concerned a state of unconstitutionality resulting from statutory 
overinclusiveness,141 for the rectification of which the TCC has granted the political branch 
a two-year remedial grace period.   
What makes Interpretation No. 755 a hedging instead of a nudging judgment is that the 
TCC has further prescribed interim relief.  Prisoners would be allowed to seek judicial 
review of the non-de minimis administrative or disciplinary measures taken by the 
correctional facilities under another statutory scheme governing administrative litigation 
should the political branch fail to respond at the expiry of the two-year period.  Yet, in 
contrast to hedging simpliciter, the TCC has taken a step further as the remedial grace period 
did not apply to the TCC-mandated interim measure.  In other words, instead of suspending 
the interim measure, the TCC has given immediate effect to it.  By substituting its own 
interim measure for the impugned statutory and regulatory provisions without delay, the TCC 
has effectively set aside the impugned statutory and regulatory provision albeit short of a 
straightforward declaration of invalidity.  
The foregoing features raise issues about the function of the two-year remedial grace 
period granted in Interpretation No. 755.  As the granted grace period suspends neither the 
effect of constitutional invalidity nor the interim measure, it seems to come closer to its 
counterpart in the nudging judgments, which is prescribed to focus public attention on the 
TCC’s judgment.  Yet, Interpretation No. 755 is anything but a nudging judgment as the 
rectification of the state of unconstitutionality does not rely on the political branch’s 
                                                
141 For the closeness of overinclusiveness to underinclusiveness in constitutional review, see Robert W. 
Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 
1049, 1061(1979).  
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cooperation.  In this sense, Interpretation No. 755 is a hedging judgment, and an augmented 
one at that, as it does not suspend the effect of the TCC-mandated interim measure.   
A close read further suggests that augmented hedging is a new twist in the TCC’s 
prescription for remedial grace periods in a deeper sense.  As observed above, the TCC 
effectively set aside the impugned statutory and regulatory provision with immediate effect 
with its own interim measure in their place, despite the remedial grace period.  In other 
words, the TCC could achieve the same effect by making a straightforward declaration of 
invalidity and prescribing a more detailed interim measure.142  Seen in this light, the 
granting of a remedial grace period in the augmented edition of hedging judgments cannot be 
duly grasped with reference only to hedging simpliciter or fully explained within the 
tripartite functional typology.   
Since 2016, the TCC has issued seven hedging, simpliciter and augmented, judgments 
in total.143  Considering the complex calculation of interim relief, the TCC may soon reach 
its institutional limit in its expansion of hedging judgments.  Yet, the emergence of the 
augmented edition seems to suggest otherwise.  As the TCC’s new self-image as a court is 
being gradually shifting focus from the pronouncement on constitutional principles to the 
implementation of constitutional rights for the people,144 augmented hedging can be seen as 
the TCC’s early attempt at the provision of equitable remedies required in individual 
litigations.  Even so, that the TCC has continued to prescribe a remedial grace period in the 
augmented hedging judgments where it plays no functional role remains a puzzle to be 
solved.     
 
 
                                                
142 Grand Justice Chang-Fa LO (羅昌發) alluded to this point in his concurring opinion. 
143 Among them, two are augmented.  Apart from Interpretation No. 755, the other augmented hedging 
judgment is Interpretation No. 763 (2018).  For other hedging judgments, see supra note 136. 
144 This is embodied in the recent Constitutional Litigation Act, which is set to come into effect in 2022.  
See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1022-26. 
 38 
IV. CHOICE OR DEFAULT? WHEN REMEDIAL GRACE PERIODS 
BECOME ROUTINE  
The foregoing functional analysis shows how the TCC has endeavored to apply the 
framework of graduated unconstitutionality it borrowed from the Civilian-Continental model 
of constitutional law to address constitutional wrongs resulting from the political branch’s 
unconstitutional acts with the help of remedial grace periods.  Nevertheless, that account 
leaves the key question unanswered: Why has the TCC turned to remedial grace periods in 
the first place?  As noted in Part III, one school of thought answers this question from the 
perspective of judicial politics, arguing that the TCC has strategically chosen to prescribe 
remedial grace periods in its unconstitutionality judgments to engage the political branch in 
institutional dialogue.145  From the doctrinal perspective, another attributes the TCC’s use of 
remedial grace periods to considerations of legal certainty.146  I take issue with such views.   
Tracking the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods, I argue that the granting of remedial 
grace periods has become routine as a function of the TCC’s evolving role in Taiwan’s 
changing constitutional landscape.  In the following, I first sketch out the TCC’s 
performance record under martial law and the rare instances of its intimation of the 
constitutional incompatibility of the political branch’s acts.  Then, apart from pinning down 
the critical juncture when remedial grace periods were first adopted in the TCC case law, I 
explain why instead of a deliberate choice, the granting of remedial grace periods has been 
routinized as the TCC’s default option in face of unconstitutional state acts. 
A. Speaking (Half) Truth to Power: The TCC’s Delphic Intimations of 
Constitutional Incompatibility under Martial Law 
The TCC has been praised for its active role in Taiwan’s transition from a party-state to 
a robust constitutional democracy starting from the 1980s so much so that two of its most 
perceptive observers even allude to a parallel between the TCC and the acclaimed South 
                                                
145 YEH, supra note 75, at 181-83; Yeh, supra note 86, at 15-21.  
146 Hwang, supra note 117, at 40. 
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African Constitutional Court. 147   Yet, before it started to flex muscle with its 
democracy-facilitating interpretations, the TCC had already built up its case law during its 
formative years (1948-85) soon after its inauguration in the then Chinese national capital, 
Nanjing, in 1948.  Although the early TCC case law was mostly concerned with the 
run-of-the-mill issues about conflicting legal interpretations between government 
departments or ordinary courts, 148  the TCC did exercise its constitutionally ordained 
jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation during that period.149  Despite their fading 
influence, the few instances of constitutional review decided in the TCC formative years has 
cast a long shadow on its subsequent case law, including the use of remedial grace periods. 
The TCC has exercised jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation since its inception 
even though it was then engulfed in the Chinese civil war.150  This by no means suggests 
that the early TCC was the TCC as we know it.  Instead, apart from setting aside some 
judicial precedents or pre-constitutional judicial interpretations,151 the TCC was anything but 
an active constitutional player.  It was more of a convenient problem-solver for the political 
branch when the political branch needed constitutional cover for its decisions than an 
independent guardian of the constitution.152  That said, the early TCC was not reduced to a 
constitutional rubberstamp, either.  Rather, it had issued two unconstitutionality judgements 
before the influential Fifth Council took office in 1985:153 Interpretation No. 86 and 166, 
which had preconditioned the way the TCC approached the constitutional validity of the 
political branch’s acts in post-authoritarian Taiwan.154 
The TCC issued Interpretation No. 86 in 1960 when Taiwan was still at the height of 
                                                
147 See David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523, 
538 (2011). 
148 These interpretations concern unification interpretations. 
149 For the TCC’s early history and role under the martial-law rule, see Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1002-09.  
150 Interpretation Nos. 1 and 2 were issued in 1949 when the TCC remained seated in Nanjing.  See Hwang 
et al., supra note 71, at 755. 
151 See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1009-10. 
152 YEH, supra note 75, at 171-72. 
153 See supra text accompanying note 70-72. 
154 See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1009-10 & n. 67. 
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“White Terror.” 155   Interpretation No. 86 concerned whether the Judicial Yuan was 
exclusively responsible for judicial administration.156  At stake was the constitutionality of 
the then Ministry of Judicial Administration under the Executive Yuan, which sat atop all the 
judicial courts apart from the TCC, the Supreme Court, and the High Court of Administrative 
Litigations as well as the Civil Servants Disciplinary Commission.  If the Ministry of 
Judicial Administration was found unconstitutional, the executive’s direct control over the 
judiciary would be weakened.  Although the TCC dodged the question of whether the 
Ministry of Judicial Administration was constitutional or not, it was explicit that the Judicial 
Yuan was exclusively responsible for the entire judicial administration according to the 
constitution and further noted that the statutes concerned should be amended accordingly.157   
Interpretation No. 86 was unprecedented as it was the first TCC judgment that put the 
constitutionality of the political branch’s act (the Organic Law of the Ministry of Judicial 
Administration) into question.  It is true that the TCC fell far short of providing a clear 
answer to the constitutional question in Interpretation No. 86.  Nevertheless, its gist is hard 
to miss when read in light of the referral document.  Even so, Interpretation No. 86 failed to 
put paid to the Ministry of Judicial Administration as the TCC barely declared it 
unconstitutional, not to mention invalid (or void).  It was not until 1980 that judicial 
administration was returned to the Judicial Yuan while the Ministry of Judicial 
Administration was reorganized as the current Ministry of Justice.  Seen in this light, 
Interpretation No. 86 is the TCC’s first intimation of constitutional incompatibility 
concerning the political branch’s acts.  
After Interpretation No. 86, it took twenty years for the TCC to question the 
constitutionality of the political branch’s act again in Interpretation No. 166.158  According 
to the Police Punishment Act, which had already existed before the constitution came into 
effect in 1947, the police were given the power to punish those who committed 
                                                
155 See generally Ketty W. Chen, Disciplining Taiwan: The Kuomintang’s Methods of Control during the 
White Terror Era (1947-1987), 4 (4) TAIWAN INT’L STUD. Q. 185 (2008). 
156 See supra note 67. 
157 For a helpful guide to Interpretation No. 86, see CHANG ET AL., supra note 69, at 456-57.  
158 Interpretation No. 166 (1980). 
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misdemeanours with a brief jail sentence or compulsory labor without a court trial.  The 
legal question before the TCC was whether the Police Punishment Act was consistent with 
the due process provision in the constitution.  As that statute had been frequently invoked 
by the police for the purposes of social control, the authoritarian police state regime was 
effectively put under the spotlight because of Interpretation No. 166.  In 1980 when the end 
of the martial-law rule was still seven years away, the TCC issued its landmark decision 
relating to fundamental rights, Interpretation No. 166, urging the political branch to amend 
the Police Punishment Act in accordance with the constitutional requirement of judicial due 
process.  It was historic indeed.  Yet, the TCC again dodged the question of whether the 
Police Punishment Act was constitutional or not.  Instead, it simply paraphrased the 
constitutional provision of due process and then urged the political branch to act accordingly 
without condemning the constitutional invalidity of the impugned statute directly.  It came 
as no surprise that the political branch was unmoved in face of the TCC’s intimation of 
constitutional incompatibility.  Eventually it took another ten years for the TCC to realize 
the goal of Interpretation No. 166 with another judicial intervention, Interpretation No. 
251159, in which the Police Punishment Act was ordered to lapse after July 1, 1991 unless 
amended according to Interpretation Nos. 166 and 251. 
Standing as exceptions to the TCC jurisprudence under martial law, Interpretation Nos. 
86 and 166 have exerted disproportionate influence on the TCC’s subsequent exercise of 
constitutional review.  As noted above, neither Interpretation No. 86 nor Interpretation No. 
166 attacked the unconstitutionality of the political branch’s acts.  To be more precise, 
neither interpretation addressed the constitutionality of the impugned state acts directly.  
Instead, the unconstitutionality judgment had to be inferred from the TCC’s veiled reasoning 
in these two interpretations.  In other words, the TCC barely made any declaration of 
constitutionality, whether in the form of invalidity or incompatibility, during the martial-law 
era.  Only by reading between the lines were the TCC’s delphic intimations of constitutional 
incompatibility in these two decisions disclosed.  The TCC did speak truth to power but just 
failed to reveal the whole truth.  In sum, the TCC did not make any declaration of invalidity 
                                                
159 Interpretation No. 251 (1990). 
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with respect to the political branch’s acts in its early exercise of constitutional review apart 
from two frustrated intimations of constitutional incompatibility. 
The TCC’s quiet and indirect disapproval of the political branch in its formative stage 
may result from the TCC’s prudent choice in face of a quasi-military dictatorship.  Yet, with 
the early intimations of constitutional incompatibility translating into the TCC’s gentle 
approach to the question of the constitutionality of the political branch’s acts, the TCC’s 
decisions on the constitutionality of the impugned state acts have since been meandering and 
elusive.  As a legacy of the delphic style set out in its early case law, judicial euphemism 
has become the hallmark of the TCC’s constitutional jurisprudence.160  This explains why 
the TCC’s declarations of invalidity read like the GFCC’s declarations of incompatibility 
while the line is sometimes blurred between declarations of incompatibility and admonitory 
decisions in the TCC case law as noted in Part III.   
More important, as Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166 indicated, mere declarations of 
incompatibility, not to mention cautious intimations, were nothing more than a paper tiger in 
the eyes of the recalcitrant political branch.  To bring about meaningful changes, the TCC 
itself must change.  Thus, how to tame the political beast without being devoured by the 
remaining forceful leviathan sets the future direction of the cautious TCC on its move toward 
becoming the constitution’s guardian as we know it.  
B. The Coming of Constitutional Grace: Democratization, Judicial 
Awakening, and Remedial Grace Periods in Taiwan 
To shed light on how remedial grace periods were employed in the TCC’s response to 
the political branch’s unconstitutional acts, I first trace their adoption when Taiwan was in 
transition from an autocratic party-state to a full-fledged constitutional democracy in the late 
1980s.  After drawing out the relationship between the TCC’s awakening and the 
emergence of remedial grace periods, I then explain why the granting of remedial grace 
periods is more a default position than a strategic choice in constitutional review in Taiwan.   
                                                
160 Cf. Lin et al., supra note 67 (discussing the influence of institutional continuity on the TCC). 
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1. At the Dawn of Democratization: Reining in the Political Branch with 
Grace 
As suggested above, the TCC experienced a long formative stage starting from 1948 to 
the end of September 1985 when the term of the Fourth Council came to an end.  At that 
time, the Nationalists (also known as Kuomintang, KMT) defeated in the Chinese civil war 
had ruled Taiwan with martial law for over thirty-five years and the strongman Chiang 
Ching-Kuo’s poor health was continuingly deteriorating after assuming the mantle of Chiang 
dynasty at the death of his father Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in 1975.161  While the 
winds of change were blowing, there was still no sign for the lifting of martial law when the 
Fifth Council took office in October 1985.  Against this backdrop, the TCC set out to turn 
itself into the constitution’s guardian.   
The reconstituted TCC soon issued its first decision in November 1985.  Continuing 
with the previous cautious approach to the constitutionality of the political branch’s act, the 
TCC affirmed the impugned administrative regulation’s constitutionality.162  Yet, it did not 
take long for the TCC to break new ground in constitutional review.  Approximately a year 
after assuming office, the recently appointed Grand Justices declared a political branch’s act 
unconstitutional for the first time.  Interpretation No. 210, which was promulgated on 
October 17, 1986, expressly declared unconstitutional an interpretive circular concerning 
taxation issued by the Ministry of Finance for its failure to comport with the constitutional 
requirement of statutory reservation.163  Despite the technical character of the impugned 
interpretive circular, the declaration of unconstitutionality/ incompatibility itself, which 
found support in the Civilian-Continental framework of graduated unconstitutionality, was 
ground-breaking as the TCC had never directly condemned any act of the political branch 
before that judgment.  Ten months later, the TCC delivered its first declaration of invalidity 
as to the political branch’s acts, another two tax interpretive circulars issued by the Ministry 
                                                
161 Chiang Ching-Kuo was Premier of the Executive Yuan when his father died and elected President in 
1978.  
162 Interpretation No. 200 (1985). 
163 According to the TCC, the impugned interpretive circular was an ultra vires administrative act as it 
lacked statutory basis.     
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of Finance, in Interpretation No. 218 on August 14, 1987.  As noted in Part III, a remedial 
grace period was granted in Interpretation No. 218, making it the TCC’s first a bridging 
judgment, i.e., a suspended declaration of invalidity.  Read together, Interpretation Nos. 210 
and 218 appeared to suggest that the TCC marked its departure from its decades-long 
formative stage by making a straight declaration of incompatibility and then took a strategic 
turn.  With the granting of a grace period, Interpretation No. 218 delayed the impact of a 
declaration of invalidity yet without repeating the mistake of the abovementioned 
Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166 if the political branch would remain as aloof as it had been.  
In this light, Interpretation Nos. 210 and 218 jointly exerted a seminal influence on the 
TCC’s dual role in Taiwan’s transition to constitutional democracy: the TCC awakened to 
the public calls for liberty and democracy with its transition-facilitating decisions while 
exercising judicial prudence to engage rather than confront the political branch with strategic 
interpretations.164 
On closer inspection, however, the storyline of the TCC as the democracy facilitator 
turns out to be more tortuous than suggested in the foregoing rosy projection.  As noted 
above, Interpretation No. 210 declared an interpretive circular of the Ministry of Finance 
incompatible with the constitution.  Juxtaposed with Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166, 
Interpretation No. 210 nonetheless seemed to be a big stride made by the TCC as it no longer 
just intimated the unconstitutionality of the political branch’s acts gingerly in its judgment.  
Yet, a close read of the TCC’s reasoning reveals that the stride turned out to be merely a 
symbolic and little step.  Interpretation No. 210 was a posthumous announcement of a 
“dead” administrative act: the impugned interpretive circular had already been rescinded 
before the judgment was promulgated.165  Instead of sentencing it to death, the TCC 
essentially issued an obituary about the deceased interpretive circular.  Speaking the words 
of constitutional incompatibility, Interpretation No. 210 was the epitome of judicial 
symbolism.166  Even such a little symbolic step was still significant indeed, only it was not 
                                                
164 See GINSBURG, supra note 16, at 106-57. 
165 Only in the reasoning was Interpretation No. 210’s posthumous character disclosed.  
166 With its posthumous declaration of the unconstitutionality of the impugned interpretive circular, 
Interpretation No. 210 enabled the individual claimant whose rights had been infringed because of that circular 
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symbolic of gradual judicial awakening in Taiwan but of the TCC’s sensitivity to signs of 
political change.  October 17, 1986, the promulgation date of Interpretation No. 210, was 
revealing. 
As suggested above, when the newly appointed Grand Justices assumed office in 
October 1985, the political atmosphere was tense in Taiwan.  Winds of political change 
were blowing but nobody knew whither the blowing wind would take Taiwan.  Defying the 
standing strict ban on new political parties under martial law, the leading political dissidents 
convened the DPP’s founding assembly on September 28, 1986.  Political crackdown was 
anxiously anticipated.  When Taiwan was kept in suspense, the frail Chiang Ching-Kuo 
gave his most important interview to Washington Post on October 7, 1986, surprising the 
world with the announcement that martial law would be lifted shortly.167  Ten days later 
came the obituary-like Interpretation No. 210, suggesting the TCC’s symbolic change in its 
institutional posture vis-a-vis the political branch.  Yet, considering its posthumous 
declaration of incompatibility and its virtual synchronization with the intimations of political 
liberalization in 1986, Interpretation No. 210 instead attested to the reconstituted TCC’s 
continuation with the habitual cautious approach to constitutional review when political thaw 
was beginning in Taiwan but spring was not there yet.   
If Interpretation No. 210 was the TCC’s symbolic move at the outset of political thaw, 
the granting of a remedial grace period in Interpretation No. 218 was indicative of the TCC’s 
restrained method of striking down the political branch’s acts in its maiden declaration of 
invalidity.  Time matters again.  When Interpretation No. 218 was promulgated on August 
14, 1987, the ground for political liberalization in Taiwan had been readily prepared.  It was 
not by chance that the TCC made its first frontal strike against the political branch exactly 
one month after martial law was formally lifted on July 15, 1987.  Nevertheless, the 
character of political rule remained authoritarian in Taiwan as the KMT still kept a firm grip 
on the political power with the help of the (rump) First Legislative Yuan elected in China in 
                                                                                                                                                  
to apply for retrial. 
167 Daniel Southerland, Taiwan President to Propose End to Island's Martial Law; Action Would Mean the 
Lifting of Restrictions After 37 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1986, at A18. 
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1948.168  In line with the symbolic Interpretation No. 210, the TCC struck the political 
branch with gentle grace in Interpretation No. 218: striking down the political branch’s 
unconstitutional act while delaying the invalidation for six months. 
In the post-martial law era, the TCC kept up its new constitutional posturing.  Between 
the historic Interpretation No. 218 and the well-commented “bootstrapping” Interpretation 
No. 261 of June 21, 1990 whereby the very long parliament (1948-1991) was put to an 
end,169 the TCC made another two declarations of invalidity vis-à-vis the political branch’s 
acts.170  Notably, both Interpretation Nos. 224 and 251 were declarations of invalidity as to 
statutes and were attached with a remedial grace period.  The former concerned a statute on 
taxation; the latter was a sequel to the toothless Interpretation No. 166, whose delphic 
intimations of the constitutional incompatibility of the pre-constitutional Police Punishment 
Act had fallen flat on its face since its promulgation ten years ago.  At that time, not only 
administrative rules but also primary legislation was within the TCC’s strike distance, though 
the TCC’s strike remained gentle.  It was not until Interpretation No. 268, issued nearly five 
months after Interpretation No. 261, that the TCC struck down a political branch’s act with 
an immediate declaration of invalidity for the first time in its history.171 
The story from then on is one well told: the TCC emerged as the constitution’s reliable 
                                                
168 See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1010-11. 
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character of Interpretation No. 261, see Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1011; see also Kuo, supra note 106, at 604. 
170 During that period, the TCC also made an immediate and ex tunc declaration of invalidity as to the ban 
on polygamy in the civil code in Interpretation No. 242 in 1989.  Yet, it was an outlier in every aspect.  
Formally, it was a declaration of invalidity with immediate and retroactive effects.  In essence, it was a 
read-down of the polygamy ban provision in the civil code to redress the petitioner’s unique personal 
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171 Interpretation No. 268 (1990) (invalidating an administrative rule). In Interpretation No. 264 (1990), the 
TCC formally issued a declaration of invalidity as to a parliamentary resolution requesting the increase of 
government expenditure in the legislative vetting of the government budget bill.  Given that the administration 
had already expressed its intent not to be bound by the impugned resolution, Interpretation No. 264 actually 
rendered that resolution non-binding rather than invalid.  It raised the question of the TCC’s role in the 
interdepartmental conflict within the political branch.  See Kuo, supra note 106.   
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guardian and democracy’s facilitator with a mix of diverse judicial strategic choices, 
including the granting of remedial grace periods.172  Through this lens, the TCC deliberately 
granted remedial grace periods to address the issues the TCC faced in the fulfilment of its 
institutional role.  From the perspective of judicial politics, the TCC granted remedial grace 
periods to engage other constitutional players, including the political branch and citizens, in 
democratic dialogues about solutions to the unconstitutionality of state acts.  Through 
engagement instead of confrontation, the TCC helped to facilitate Taiwan’s transition to 
constitutional democracy by strategically granting remedial grace periods when it tackled the 
political branch’s unconstitutional acts.173  Alternatively, as with the GFCC’s approach to 
safeguarding the integrity of the German constitution through managing the legal effects of 
unconstitutionality, the granting of remedial grace periods was the TCC’s deliberate choice 
to uphold the rule of law principle by striking balance between constitutional integrity and 
legal certainty.174  Both take the view that the granting of remedial grace periods was the 
TCC’s deliberate choice.  Does the granting of remedial grace periods really result from 
choice? 
2. Beyond Strategic Choice: The Road toward Grace by Default 
As indicated in Part III, the TCC has granted remedial grace periods in a wide range of 
subjects.  Against this backdrop, the theory based on the strategy of institutional dialogue is 
less convincing than it seems as it holds that the TCC’s strategic choices to engage the 
political branch in solving the unconstitutionality of the latter’s acts converged on the 
granting of remedial grace periods across diverse cases.  As most cases attached with 
remedial grace periods centered on bridging rather than the more dialogical nudging (or 
hedging), the claimed dialogical function of granting remedial grace periods is even more 
ambiguous.  Moreover, given the high percentage (around 30%) of the political branch’s 
inaction vis-à-vis its bridging judgments, it is hard to see why the TCC failed to reconsider 
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173 YEH, supra note 75, at 181-83; Yeh, supra note 86, at 15-20. 
174 See Hwang, supra note 117, at 40. 
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its strategy.  The judicial dialogic argument does not fly.   
The rule of law argument does not carry the explanation of the TCC’s frequent use of 
remedial grace periods as a result of institutional choice very far, either.  As the TCC has 
granted remedial grace periods in such diverse situations, the suggestion that they all resulted 
from the TCC’s careful balance of constitutional integrity and legal certainty is 
unconvincing.175  Had the diverse use of remedial grace periods been the result of balancing 
according to the rule of law principle, this would suggest that the TCC tipped the rule of law 
balance in favor of legal certainty by default.  If so, the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods 
is more of a default option than a deliberative choice in judicial remedy. 
True, to say that the TCC has granted remedial grace periods almost by default does not 
mean that the TCC has automatically prescribed a grace period to any new judgement 
without considering the issues before it.  As discussed in Part III, the TCC has consciously 
tweaked its use of remedial grace periods to prod the political branch into action in face of 
new challenges resulting from structural issues or unconstitutional under-/overinclusive 
legislation.  The problem is that bridging, the original model, has remained to be the staple 
of the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods since the steep rise of granting grace periods in 
2007,176 even though nudging and hedging are more suitable choices for such issues.177   
Again, this defeats the explanation based on the TCC’s institutional choice when confronted 
with complex constitutional issues.     
Another possible choice-based explanation is based on the correlation between the 
sharp increase in the use of remedial grace periods and the replacement of the Sixth Council 
with Grand Justices appointed to staggered terms.178  On this view, with the resulting 
weakening of ideological homogeneity, remedial grace periods may have been invoked as the 
medium to bring the Grand Justices together in face of the two-thirds majority required for 
                                                
175 Cf. id. 
176 See supra Table 1.  
177 This proposition was not borne out until 2016.  In the period 2016-18, there have been thirteenth 
interpretations attached with a remedial grace period: four bridging judgments, two nudging judgment, and 
seven hedging judgments.  Given the short period, however, it is unclear that a pattern is emerging.  
178 See supra text accompanying note 75.  
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constitutional review of statutes.179  Viewed thus, the granting of remedial grace periods 
appeared to help to bridge the gap between the Grand Justices who were more assertive about 
the TCC’s ordained constitutional guardianship and those who were more sympathetic to the 
political branch’s position.180   
There are some pieces missing from this explanation.  As indicated in Table 1, the 
granting of remedial grace periods increased steeply after October 1, 2007 when the terms of 
the sitting Grand Justices began to become staggered, with the percentage spiking to over 
60%.  To replace the retired Grand Justices appointed in 2003 for a four-year term, the new 
Grand Justices were appointed by the same DPP president who had appointed the holdovers 
for an eight-year term in 2003.  It was not until a year later that another cohort appointed by 
the new KMT president joined the TCC.  Yet, between October 1, 2007 and October 31, 
2008, during which all sitting Grand Justices were appointed by the same president, the TCC 
prescribed remedial grace periods six times in its nine judgments of unconstitutionality.181  
This shows that before the appearance of ideological divide in November 2008, the 
percentage had already risen sharply.  Seen in this light, the post-2007 change has more to 
do with the personnel replacement, including the longest serving President-Grand Justice 
Weng’s retirement in 2007,182 than ideological differences.  
Another reason that the ideological difference-based explanation does not hold water is 
that the TCC was virtually sidelined in significant constitutional cases in the period 
2008-16.183  The cases coming before the TCC during that period did not bear on underlying 
ideological differences among Grand Justices, which would have to be bridged by the 
employment of remedial grace periods.  Building majority by bridging ideological divide 
thus fails to account for the continuing increase on the use of remedial grace periods when 
                                                
179 This is set to be changed with the coming into effect of the new Constitutional Litigation Act in 2022.  
See Lin et al, supra note 67, at 1025. 
180 Yeh, supra note 86, at 24-26. 
181 Those six interpretations are Interpretation Nos. 636, 638, 640, 641, 645, and 649. 
182 Justice Weng was first appointed to the Third Council of Grand Justices as an Associate Grand Justice in 
1972.  
183 Kuo, supra note 106, at 625-39. 
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the TCC steered clear of contentious constitutional issues.184  In addition, the TCC’s recent 
move from the lame nudging to the biting hedging belies the majority-building explanation 
as such move would only intensify the fighting between the opposing camps among the 
Grand Justices.  In sum, managing ideological differences does not explain the continuing 
growth of remedial grace periods in the TCC case law. 
If none of the above explanations suffice, what on earth has made the TCC continue to 
look to remedial grace periods in dealing with the political branch’s unconstitutional acts?  
Look beyond the horizon of institutional choices.  As noted above, the TCC granted a 
remedial grace period in its first declaration of invalidity following the lifting of martial law 
in Taiwan.185  Yet, without the innovative technique of remedial grace periods, the wait 
would have been much longer for the TCC’s departure from its past practice of delphically 
intimating the constitutional incompatibility of the political branch’s acts in its formative 
stage.  Seen in this genealogical light, suspended declarations of invalidity in the form of 
bridging judgments emerged as the TCC’s archetype of strike against the political branch’s 
unconstitutional acts when the TCC was rising from its formative years.   
As indicated in Table 1, October 2007 is the watershed in the TCC’s employment of 
remedial grace periods.  It is when President-Grand Justice Weng, the last Grand Justice 
who took part in the first granting of a remedial grace period in 1987,186 retired from the 
TCC.  Since then, over half of the total of eighty-six cases attached with a remedial grace 
period have been issued.187  With the TCC’s collegiate memory fading at President-Grand 
Justice Weng’s retirement and its formative experience of striking by bridging receding into 
the background of institutional consciousness,188 the frequent granting of remedial grace 
                                                
184 Id. at 625-33. 
185 Interpretation No. 218 (1987).   
186 Id. 
187 Forty-seven judgements attached with a remedial grace period have been issued during this period.  
188 This needs to be distinguished from the collegiality claim that because of the weakening of collegiality 
following the staggering of the terms of Grand Justices, the TCC turned to remedial grace periods as a means to 
build the crucial two-thirds majority.  It is true that the weakening of collegiality may make reaching a 
unanimous judgment harder and this explains the TCC’s recent move towards a “plurivocal court.”  See Lin et 
al., supra note 67, at 1025-26.  For the notion of a plurivocal court, see MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, 
JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 244-45 
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periods reflects the TCC’s sedimented position on judicial remedy, despite the tweaks of 
nudging and hedging.  Taken together, bridging, nudging, and hedging are a function of the 
TCC’s default option in unconstitutionality management set at the dawning of Taiwan’s 
transition to constitutional democracy.     
V. CONCLUSION    
Remedial grace periods have been in the toolkit of apex courts for decades but only 
comes to the fore in comparative constitutional law recently thanks to scholarship on 
constitutional review in the Common Law jurisdictions.  Through this lens, the granting of 
remedial grace periods is treated as part of remedial measures in constitutional review, while 
the focus is on how “biting” a suspended declaration of invalidity is.189  Looking beyond the 
Common Law realm, I argued that variations on the use of remedial grace periods reflect 
how the concept of unconstitutionality is understood and how its consequences are managed 
in different legal traditions.  Through a case study of Taiwan in a comparative light, I 
showed how the court’s role vis-à-vis the political branch in the dynamics of constitutional 
politics and the legal tradition jointly contribute to the multifunctional role of remedial grace 
periods in unconstitutionality management.  On the one hand, in light of comparative 
constitutional review, the TCC’s granting of remedial grace periods does not consist with 
theoretical models built on the Common Law jurisdictions.  Rather, as with the 
Civilian-Continental model of constitutional review, remedial grace periods in Taiwan were 
not always attached to declarations of invalidity but have functionally evolved in forms of 
bridging, nudging, and hedging as part of the judicial strategy to rein in the political branch 
under the conceptual framework of graduated unconstitutionality.  On the other hand, 
remedial grace periods have been instrumental to the TCC’s realization of its institutional 
potential in constitutional review.  Thanks to such measures, the TCC could strike the still 
untamed political branch with gentle grace when Taiwan was just ridding herself of the 
authoritarian yoke.  The TCC’s continuing and frequent prescription for remedial grace 
                                                                                                                                                  
(2004).  Nevertheless, it is unclear whether collegiality bears on the judgment as to the impugned state act’s 
constitutional conformity.     
189 See Yap, supra note 8, at 37-39. 
 52 
periods in the post-martial law era is indicative of its default position in constitutional 
remedies informed by the Civilian-Continental model and molded in its formative experience 
at the dawn of democratization.  In a comparative light, the granting of remedial grace 
periods is not just a strategic choice in constitutional remedies.  The significance of 
remedial grace periods only becomes clear in light of legal tradition and the politics of 
unconstitutionality management. 
